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Abstract 
 This thesis investigates the potential legal utility of neurotechnologies which measure correlates 
of impulsive behaviors. Chapter 1 explains my philosophical position and how this position compares 
to others in the field. Chapter 2 explores some of the technical concepts which must be understood for 
the discussion of neurotechnologies and their applications to be fruitful. These chapters will be 
important for both explaining the capabilities of a neuroscientific approach to neural abnormalities as 
well as how they relate to the kind of regulation in which the law is engaged. 
 The purpose of Chapter 3 will be a descriptive account of Canadian law where I will begin to 
explore how to apply ideas and experiments from neuroscience to specific areas of law. Chapter 3 will 
look at actual examples of Canadian criminal law and will span topics from the creation of law to the 
construction of appropriate sentences. 
 Chapter 4 will debate if and how we should apply the neuroscientific perspective to the law 
given the ethical concerns surrounding the applications described in Chapter 3. The thrust of the 
chapter is that the development of the law does not occur in a vacuum and any alteration either to the 
laws themselves, how they are interpreted, or the technologies used to provide evidence, must have an 
ethical justification, that is, a way in which the proposed change will better meet the needs of society 
and the ethical objectives of the law. Sometimes these justifications can be drawn directly from 
constitutional documents, such as the Charter, or from the Criminal Code, while at other times these 
justifications depend upon arguments about furthering meaningful responsibility and therapeutic 
outcomes. 
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Chapter 1: Philosophical Background 
 
“I will assume for the present that it is no illusion. My first act of free will shall be to believe in free 
will.” - William James, 1870 
 
 Chapter 1 examines the philosophical arguments important to neurolaw. I will position my 
approach within this literature and explain what makes my account unique. Doing so will require 
introduction to some basic concepts concerning human responsibility important to both neuroscience 
and the law and which will remain relevant throughout this work. 
 
Section 1 – Philosophical Background and My Own Position: 
 Neurolaw is an emerging field which is slowly gaining in popularity and notoriety. Supporters 
and critics are engaged in discussions about whether and how our knowledge of the nervous system 
(neuroscience) should affect how we regulate behaviour in society (law). The infancy of the field is 
both a blessing and a curse. On one hand it means that most of the arguments are highly speculative 
and theoretical. On the other it allows a substantial amount of freedom to create a unique approach to 
combining our knowledge of the neurological basis of behaviour and the rules society uses to govern 
human conduct. 
 The basic philosophical difficulties within neurolaw are best explored through two leading and 
competing conceptions concerning the relationship between legal reasoning and the brain. One camp 
argues that the law is fundamentally based on folk psychological reasoning. The term “folk 
psychological” is an academic way of referring to the normal psychological reasons we give for actions 
using concepts such as intentions, beliefs, moods, and emotions. Morse, the clearest voice from this 
camp, argues that since these are the leading concepts within not only the law but our everyday 
experience, they must be the basic formula for our legal system. (Morse, 2011). 
 In opposition to this view is the one put forward by Greene and Cohen which begins with the 
paired ideas that the law is interested in regulating behaviour and that all behaviour is mediated by the 
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brain. Therefore when we make laws to alter behaviour we should be talking in the direct and 
declarative language of brains and the activations of their constituent parts, not in terms of whatever 
vague folk psychological concepts may or may not in fact underlie action. Since this view describes 
people in terms of neural phenomena worthy of study it naturally leads us to question the nature of 
responsibility, including the responsibility which we ascribe to criminals. Greene and Cohen contend 
that if an action can be wholly described in terms of the activities of the determined brain then there is 
no room for the kind of free will required for us to ascribe responsibility, and, more to the point, 
retributive justice (Greene and Cohen, 2004). 
 There are multiple complications which occur when one tries to combine these two views of the 
human behaviour. One centers around the concept of truth. If behaviour is what the law regulates, and 
what the brain generates, then the claims made by Green and Cohen seem to speak more directly about 
the reality they wish to describe. Surely the law, an institution with truth finding as one of its primary 
functions, should attempt to use the truest language to describe its subjects. 
 A difficulty arises, however, when one has to further consider the appropriateness or 
applicability of a scientific truth given the criminal trial context. One may know to a scientific certainty 
that in a scan given under laboratory conditions a certain action or triggered mind state will always 
present the same pattern on a neuroimaging output screen. There will be, however, any number of 
objections to how well that experiment maps onto real world criminal conduct. While these critiques 
should fade as technologies become more reliable, technological limits should not be ignored. 
Furthermore, even a perfectly designed experiment must be presented by experts in a court 
context which, depending on the effectiveness of council, the funds available, and the understanding of 
the judge, may fail to appropriately present its findings. On the other hand folk psychology with its 
language of thoughts, emotions, beliefs, moods, desires, motivations, and impulses has allowed some 
societies to reach a state which is a fair approximation of a just system. 
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 In large part my view sides with Morse. It seems clear that as long as the law regulates our 
behaviour within society, and as long as that behaviour consists of normal people interacting using folk 
psychological reasoning, then the law will itself be folk psychological. If the law is to model and guide 
human life then it must reflect the human experience, which is currently conducted in the folk 
psychological domain. As the language of neuroscience becomes more used and useful, and as society 
is educated in the nature of its conclusions, this way of doing things may well change. It may one day 
not be so strange for one to speak just as comfortably about their amygdalar activity as they do about 
fear, anger, or aggression. This is approximately the stance taken by several eminent neuro-
philosophers including Dan Dennett and Paul and Patricia Churchland (Dennett, 2009; Churchland, 
1985). 
 The position put forward by Greene and Cohen is surely an interesting philosophical abstraction 
but I can see no way of it reasonably mapping onto our current way of conceiving of our selves. By this 
I mean that there are some apparent psychological contradictions that occur when one tries to live one's 
life through certain scientific lenses. For example, we now know that we do not live in the clockwork 
universe described by Newton. Relativity and Quantum Mechanics have revealed that when things are 
very large, or very small, or moving very fast they are much stranger than we could have imagined. 
Non-Euclidean Geometry revealed that even how we mathematically describe space has a number of 
different non-intuitive forms. However when one tries to live one's daily life bearing these concepts in 
mind our psychology stumbles. To walk around knowing that light is both a wave and a particle, and 
that space and time are actually continuous and our travel through one limits our travel through the 
other, and that there could quite likely be dozens of spatial dimensions packed away so tightly that they 
we cannot see them but which are at the same time at every point in space, is a psychological non-
starter (at least for those of us who aren't an Einstein or a Tesla).  
 Whether the difficulty of eschewing folk psychology is fundamental to human biology or 
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whether it is purely a cultural phenomenon which can be overcome is beyond the scope of this work. 
That question could perhaps best be answered from a sociological perspective studying what kind of 
society would be required in order to conceive of ourselves in purely neurological terms. Certainly the 
practices, rituals, and philosophy of such a society would be significantly different than those found in 
modern day Canada and the laws with which it governs. 
 If such a shift in culture and individual psychology is possible it is another question entirely 
whether it would be desirable. Traditional ways of understanding deviance giving way to more physical 
qua medical characterizations has been heavily critiqued by eminent sociological scholars (Conrad and 
Schneider, 1992; Pfohl, 1994). It is my hope that by attempting to take a middle position my theories 
avoid these dangers, however they must be kept in mind if we are to avoid emerging into a Huxlian 
future of good citizenship only through prescription. While the above topic is of unending interest this 
thesis is concerned primarily with the application of particular technologies to specific legal concepts 
and will not dwell on these broader macro-social concerns. 
 To return to the matter at hand, while I side with those who base the law within folk psychology 
I wish to separate myself from them in one important respect. Most of the papers written by this camp 
tend to show why current legal reasoning is incompatible with neuroscience and then say something 
like 'hence neuroscience will have only a limited usefulness in the near future' (Morse, 2011). This 
attitude rests primarily on two grounds. The first is the quite reasonable notion that given the novel 
nature of neuroscience, and the unpredictable ways it advances and is applied, it is foolhardy to make 
any sure predictions as to whether neurotechnologies will be able to answer some of the fundamental 
questions of human existence (e.g. Is this person trustworthy? Is this person telling the absolute truth? 
How is my consciousness and deliberation causally involved in the behaviours I engage in?). The 
second is a reaction to the overconfidence shown in neuroscience in recent years by those who are 
insufficiently informed. When a fervor is whipped up about how neurotechnologies are going to be able 
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to solve all of these fundamental problems it is the appropriate response of the loyal opposition to take 
an equally strong stance in the opposite direction. 
 I believe, however, that with the appropriate application and development of existing 
technologies, that is their development specifically to answer actual legal questions pertaining to actual 
events which concern the law, neuroscience could have a significant effect in the near future. It will not 
do so by overturning fundamental approaches to the law but by allowing us to clarify the folk 
psychological concepts we currently use and to see if these explanations make sense given what 
neuroscience is discovering about brains. It is my contention that the careful application of 
neurotechnologies and behavioural testing to investigate the concepts already found important to the 
law will allow us to use those concepts in a way which has both greater objectivity and is more in tune 
with ethical objectives.  
 Other authors have attempted to find a similar middle ground, some within the realm of impulse 
control (Penney, 2014) and others in distinct but important areas ranging from measuring pain and 
distress to making sense of the reactions of artificial intelligences (Kolber, 2014). These authors have 
one important thing in common, they recognize either an existing or extremely likely overlap between 
law and neuroscience and try to describe it in a way that will be practically useful in a legal context. 
While there is some philosophizing the reality of the problems on which these authors work means that 
the vast majority of their arguments are from a practical legal perspective. As such they have found a 
middle ground, a position from which all that neuroscience has found that can be practically useful to 
the law is fitted in to the model while making relatively few claims about the broader legal question of 
whether or not this science will fundamentally shift the entire law as we know it. 
 Furthermore, I argue that neuroscience can suggest applications of the law which are not 
currently available in Canada. Other jurisdictions have developed unique approaches to the problems of 
impulse control and responsibility and the adaptation of these approaches to the Canadian context calls 
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for significant discussion. 
 Finally, a few words on my thoughts about the primacy of ethical concerns. I argue that any 
time a change is consciously made it is made for reasons with ethical justifications. That is, changes are 
made because the person or group making the change believes that it will bring about some good. 
Whether or not that change is actually wanted, needed, or desirable upon a wider or longer view is up 
for debate. The field of ethics exists in order to engage in precisely this debate. Therefore, as I discuss 
how neurotechnology can affect the law, in order for this discussion to mean anything to the real world 
there must also be a related discussion of how it should affect the law. Though this content doesn't 
appear in full until Chapter 4 this brief word now better outlines my motivations. 
 
Subsection 1 - Determinism, Neuroscience, and Responsibility: 
 Usually the first thing that makes the philosophically-minded excited about neuroscience is its 
position within the deterministic thesis. Basically put, if every effect has a cause, and the cause of our 
behaviour is the activity of our brains (as far as we can tell), then all behaviour can be reduced to brain 
activity over which we have no truly free control. If one follows the logic out to its end this conception 
holds no place for what we traditionally would call our 'self', that is the free agent who can make 
responsible decisions about how to behave. In other words, in order for freedom to exist there must 
have been the ability to do otherwise. In a fully determined universe this causa sui possibility simply 
doesn't exist such that one can “pull oneself up into existence by the hair, out of the swamps of 
nothingness” (Nietzsche, 1886). 
 It is my belief that, while deterministic debates work to get people excited, reducing 
neuroscience to determinism is just about the worst thing for the realistic characterization of the field. 
The first problem is that it sets the bar of utility too high. It puts people in the mindset that if the results 
of a test don't fit into a causal theory then the result is not useful. A causal theory is one which 
professes to explain each of the series of steps from initial cause to final effect. This can be understood 
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by analogy to dominoes. If a theory says that knocking down the first domino will cause the last one to 
fall, but makes no suggestion of how many dominos there are in the middle, or what their arrangement 
is, then it is correlative theory as opposed to a causal one. It makes the field extremely easy to critique 
when forcing neuroscience into the position of having to offer a causal theory that can completely map 
onto common sense concepts. Anything less than success in this enterprise implies 'limited usefulness 
in the near future'. 
 For example, one knows that turning the ignition in a car will turn it on, but one might have no 
idea why this is so. If we require a full causal explanation for how ignition happens before taking a 
drive then it could be a long time indeed before any movement takes place. However upon gathering a 
full explanation of ignition, while one may certainly be more informed and may now even be able to 
design a better ignition system, the full explanation was by no means required before the knowledge 
that turning the key turns on the car could have been put to use. This way of thinking primarily about 
correlation as opposed to causation has already proven useful for developing DNA related forensic 
technologies and, as will be explored later, should be a driving force behind the development of 
neurolegal applications. 
 
Subsection 2 – A Middle Position: 
 Accepting this middle position there emerges the ability of neuroscience to significantly change 
our ideas concerning legal responsibility. It will do so not by disproving that responsibility exists but 
instead by extending the way we have always questioned responsibility: by providing alternate 
explanations for behaviour whose freedom we already question. If someone acts obviously against their 
own interests, or in a way completely uncharacteristic of our experience with them, or under the 
influence of drugs or strong emotions, then we have reason to question their responsibility for those 
actions, though our reasons in each case may be quite distinct. As neuroscience nuances our 
understanding of all of these concepts we will be better able to identify contradictions and 
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abnormalities which could not have been previously explained to a standard the law would accept. 
 Indeed neuroscience and its associated technologies may be required to further develop our 
ideas around responsibility. Even with carefully designed psychological experiments we may not be 
able to find sufficient evidence for a person’s peculiar actions, or evidence for what makes one person's 
level of responsibility different from another's. For example, someone could be objectively not fully 
responsible for a particular action, but we have no legally legitimate way of reaching this conclusion 
given our limited ability to interact with that person's brain. Neurotechnologies provide more and 
different paths of interaction through which information about a person's physiology and brain function 
will make their conscious role in such behaviour intelligible. 
 
Chapter Conclusion: 
 This chapter serves as in introduction to the important philosophical concepts within the field of 
neurolaw. It also demonstrates a novel characterization of neuroscience, and the neurotechnological 
tools that it has developed, which both avoids the problems associated with determinism while 
maintaining the relevance of neuroscience for explanations of behaviour and responsibility. 
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Chapter 2: Introductory Concepts 
 
“As punishments are only inflicted for the abuse of that free will, which god has given man, it is just 
that a man should be excused for those acts, which are done through unavoidable force and 
compulsion.” - Blackston, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 1861 
 
 In Chapter 1 I introduced the philosophical questions at issue within Neurolaw and some that 
arise more broadly within Neuroscience. I explained my own position as a middle ground between the 
two poles of opinion currently found within the field. In this chapter I will explore the concepts needed 
to understand how neurotechnologies can be useful to the law. I will explain how the law creates 
models, how these models use evidence of behaviour to prove their constituent elements, and how we 
can start to understand the results of neurotechnologies through closely designed studies. 
 
Section 1 – The Law as a Model Generating System: 
 One can conceive of both the law (which uses common sense folk psychological reasoning) and 
neuroscience (which uses scientific and inductive reasoning) as model generating mechanisms. Legal 
statutes create models of mental and physical characteristics and then use evidence of various 
behaviours to fit an individual into those models. For example, committing murder after deliberation 
and committing murder on a spur of the moment impulse are two models into which an individual 
under investigation could be fit. The police and prosecution would use evidence related to the crime 
and the behaviour of any suspect under investigation to predict which model fits the crime. If there was 
a weapon involved, is there evidence to show that it was bought for that purpose or was it simply a 
weapon of opportunity? Was the accused being provoked? Did the accused leave behind any evidence 
of murderous intent such as notebooks or the like? Using the available evidence and previous 
experience with similar evidence, the prosecution can fit a charge to the crime and then an individual to 
that charge. 
 Neuroscience operates in a very similar fashion. A test of impulsiveness, for example, will 
present a choice between two options. Each option will represent a model of a type of brain, for 
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example one which can delay gratification, and one which cannot. We can then use evidence of that 
individual subject's specific neuroanatomy and functional imaging profile, along with previous 
experience of this type of evidence, to predict which model their brain fits into. While the law for the 
most part aims its predictions at events which may or may not have occurred in the past and 
neuroscience towards events in the future, there is no great difference in the approaches. Each relies on 
correlates of mind-state and behaviour and from then draws conclusions held to a standard accepted by 
the discipline. 
 When we look at the law as an arena for creating and testing the fit of certain models it makes it 
clearer how neuroscientific evidence can be useful. While maintaining our folk psychological criteria 
we can use neuroscience to accentuate the contours of these concepts by listening to components of 
their expression we have not previously been privy to. For example, imagine a statute which states that 
if a person was unable to control an impulse to act then they are not criminally responsible for their 
actions. Depending on how that law was enacted or empowered, in order to fit someone to that model 
one would have to provide evidence for that assertion which either leaves a reasonable doubt or shifts 
the balance of probabilities. Because so much of what we call impulse control happens without visible 
external behaviour one way of making this easier would be to catalog correlates of brain states and to 
show a significant departure from normal activity (that is the activity shown when the person is 
engaged in tasks which don't evoke strong or overpowering subconscious impulses) when stimuli like 
those encountered during commission of the crime are presented. This activity can then be compared to 
that elicited by tasks known to induce impulsive reactions. If the patterns can be argued to be 
sufficiently similar the results can be used to corroborate the claim that the accused was not able to 
control his or her impulse. 
 
Subsection 1 - Components of the Legal Model: 
 There are many unanswered questions about how the activity and anatomy seen on a brain scan 
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relate to our normal experience of reality and to the concepts of import within the law. To perform our 
comparison a logical and straightforward approach is to first break down the concepts within the legal 
model of criminal behaviour and see how neuroscience has gone about or could go about studying the 
relevant correlates. 
 Just like any effort interested in uncovering the truth of a matter (to the best of the ability of the 
participants given the time and resource limitations), the criminal law has a general model which 
breaks down into individual components and then evidence and standards of evidence to speak to the 
likelihood of each component. The vast majority of criminal statutes break down into the Actus Reus (a 
voluntary action) and a Mens Rea (a state of mind), potentially also including circumstantial and 
consequential elements (Roach, 2011). Mens Rea can further be broken down into its constituent 
components. Mens Rea can be knowledge, intention, desire, recklessness, or negligence (with this list 
depending on the jurisdiction). Which of these concepts applies to the individual in question depends 
on the evidence which attests of their state of mind. 
 The Actus Reus breaks down into two components, the action itself and the internal workings of 
the mind such that we describe that action as voluntary (Roach, 2011). This differs from Mens Rea in 
that the mental content of the Actus Reus is not an attitude but instead a capacity. Both components of 
the Actus Reus have been studied extensively by neuroscience. Actions are mediated through the 
activity of our motor cortex, spinal cord, and peripheral nervous system and result in what 
neuroscientists call 'motoric behaviour' (Giovanna et al. 2012). The anatomy of each of these steps has 
been extensively studied in animals and significantly in humans and the characterization of the central 
and peripheral systems related to motor control is the closest we have come to a complete 
understanding of any part of our neuroanatomy and function (Kandel et al. 2014). 
 The volitional component of the Actus Reus will be the focus of this work. This area has not 
been as extensively delineated as motor function as it appears to comprise a number of interacting 
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capacities at least involving one's ability to attend to a stimulus, the power of that stimulus to bring 
about an impulse to act, the ability to suppress that impulse, how quickly this suppression can happen, 
and if this suppression can happen in distracting environments (and these are only those capacities of 
self-control which relate to impulse control and not problems of perception or delusion). A thorough 
description of these impulse related capacities will follow. It bears mentioning early that all Western 
courts agree that without either the motoric component (whence the crime will have gone 
uncommitted) or the volitional component, criminal culpability cannot attach (R. v. Ruzic; R v. Lucki). 
 Any determination of the truth or nature of these aforementioned components can be analyzed 
scientifically. Scientific evidence presented in the court room to prove an element must meet certain 
standards. Scientific evidence must be: Relevant to the legal concept at issue; the expert providing the 
evidence must be qualified to do so; and there must be evidence of scientific validity (Roach, 2011). 
This latter category itself must meet specific criteria but what those criteria are depend on the 
jurisdiction, the type of case, and the type of trial. Usually expert scientific testimony must at least be: 
sufficiently low in error rate, it must be falsifiable, it should have undergone some peer review, and the 
methods used must be generally accepted within the field (this is the “Daubert” standard) (Morse and 
Roskies, 2013). While applying current results from neuroscientific studies encounters problems with 
these rules, for example in terms of relevance to specific legal concepts, there is no reason to believe 
that a carefully designed experiment wouldn't be able to overcome at least some of these obstacles. The 
procedural issues alluded to in Chapter 1 should also be kept in mind. 
 
Section 2 – Making Neuroscience Useful to the Law: 
 Above we have seen how the law is a system which creates models of unacceptable conduct 
which break down into constituent parts. Each of these components is shown to be true to a certain 
standard (usually beyond reasonable doubt) by providing evidence which must itself meet certain 
criteria. Before exploring actual statutes there are a few more concepts to explain related to either 
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applying neuroscientific evidence as it stands to the law or designing neuroscientific experiments 
which will be able to provide such evidence. 
 
Subsection 1 – Neurotechnologies as Novel Behavioural Outputs: 
 Above I stated that the law uses evidence of behaviours to fit a person to one model or another. 
Just as we did with the model analysis above, we can distribute behaviours into different categories and 
doing so should clarify what makes neurotechnologies particularly useful.  
 The type of behaviour with which we are most familiar is motoric behaviour: the physical 
movements of our bodies mediated through our nerve impulses and muscle potentials (Kandel et al., 
2000). This same model underlays most of the behaviours and evidence used by courts in the past. The 
brain activates in some fashion as a reaction to the external and internal environment, this activity is 
communicated to the muscles, and works through our bodies to produce externally visible behaviours 
which leave a trace on the environment. In the normal court circumstance, these behavioural traces are 
the evidence and are used to infer the relevant internal states. This evidence could consist in actions, 
words, reflexes, or secretions (for example increased sweat production as measured by the Galvanic 
Response), all of which, when understood properly, can be indicators of a relevant internal state. 
 As a direct complement to this way of gathering evidence, neurotechnologies allow us to gain 
greater resolution on the internal workings of the brain by providing another path by which a 
previously hidden set of behaviours can emerge. Instead of being conducted through the spinal cord 
and muscles, these behaviours are mediated through devices which detect electrical, magnetic, or 
metabolic changes in certain brain regions and subsequent analysis of the results. 
 With each new path from brain to environment the skilled observer can say with greater 
certainty whether a relevant mental state is or was present. For example, it becomes quite clear that 
someone is upset when they are: muttering, moving nervously, and are sweating heavily (given these 
are not normal behaviours of that individual). If neurotechnologies and their applications are developed 
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with rigor and care they will simply add yet another indicator such that the person would be muttering, 
moving nervously, sweating heavily, and have a high amygdular activity as revealed through an fMRI.  
In the end we are engaging in mind reading but only an accentuated version of the mind reading 
humans have always conducted through the observation of behaviours, the evidence thereof, and 
inference as to internal states of mind. 
 
Subsection 2 - Blood Typing, Genome Analysis, Neuroscience, and the Law: 
 The skeptical reader may ask: if neurotechnologies don't signify a magic bullet in solving the 
problem of mind reading (notice the high bar set by determinism) then why dedicate so much time and 
effort to their development? I'll briefly illustrate why neurotechnologies are so important, and what 
makes them especially useful, via an analogy to blood typing evidence and DNA evidence. Both of 
these technologies have been used by the law in the past and how they developed might well enlighten 
us to the future development of neuroscientific evidence.  
 Blood typing as it was practiced for most of its existence consists in the analysis of the reaction 
of blood cells in solution. When two samples of blood are mixed together, with some other reagents, 
they are either compatible and mix or are incompatible and the blood cells aggregate (Muehlberger and 
Inbau, 1936). Through studying the reaction of samples of related subjects it was found that blood 
types were heritable and were thus candidates for determining heredity. Though it wasn't usually 
possible to confirm heredity it was possible to eliminate someone as a candidate if the proposed parent 
had a blood type which, given the known blood type of the other parent, could not have led to the 
child's blood type. Similarly it could eliminate or implicate a suspect if a sample of blood either at the 
scene of a crime or on a weapon was determined to have been of the accused’s type. 
 Blood typing is an excellent example of evidence which is useful through traditional folk 
psychological reasoning and natural observation insofar as they are both based on immediately 
available and natural explanations of the phenomena. It uses the reaction of blood as evidence to 
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predict naturally accessible relationship models (mother, father, the perpetrator’s blood, etc). The 
components of the model are given by common sense experience, the basis of folk psychological 
reasoning, and the evidence used to predict those components relies on easily visible cellular biological 
reactions. By itself blood typing suggests very little. It does not help us write better laws (other than 
perhaps rules of evidence) and offers us nothing in terms of detecting novel and singular relationships 
between a sample and a person. 
 The role of DNA in heredity wasn't confirmed until much later (Hershey and Chase, 1952) and 
wasn't used as a forensic technique until 1988 (Freckelton, 1990). Since then DNA fingerprinting has 
essentially replaced blood typing within the court. Once its role in heredity was confirmed it proved to 
be a much more powerful tool than blood typing. DNA evidence could actually predict heredity and 
place suspects, as opposed to just implicate and eliminate. Depending on the test it can even suggest a 
suspect's race, sex, and physical characteristics, all being highly correlated to particular genes. Yet 
further the relationship between genetics and certain types of criminal behaviour is currently being 
explored and if adopted by the law would allow us to refine our current legal models with easily 
testable genetic components (Beecher-Monas and Garcia-Rill, 2006). 
 DNA is proving such a powerful and predictive discovery that it could one day be used beyond 
its current applications to actually shape how we create and deploy the law. This appears to be because 
DNA represents a kind of bedrock in terms of heritable information, that is, it is impossible 
scientifically to go any deeper than the working of DNA when it comes to heritable traits. The reason 
blood types could be used for heredity was because certain genes encoded them. The brain seems to 
represent a similar bedrock in terms of mental states, which is why the sciences that study its various 
expressions hold such potential for the law.  
 DNA fingerprinting, the type of test predominantly used by courts, relies on identifying many 
small sequences that have been found to be highly correlated with heredity (Treff et al., 2010). Here we 
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have a powerful scientific technique making clear the concepts of heredity already important to a folk 
psychological law and allowing for further expansion. Yet surprisingly, there are relatively few causal 
(that is, proven biomechanical) explanations. Due to their predictive power the results remain useful 
even if no causal mechanism is put forward for why Gene X predicts Phenotype Y with a 95% 
correlation. It is likely that a concerted effort from neuroscience would lead to at the least similar tests 
which identify structural, that is physical changes in the brain, and functional, that is changes in the 
electrical or metabolic activity of the brain, correlates of many of the mental and physical states that are 
already important to the law. What is required is to study these states in particular as opposed to 
making inferences from a field currently dominated by medical concerns. 
 
Section 4 - Impulse: 
 Having explored in brief how neuroscience can be used by the law, we now need a subject 
matter on which these tools can be applied. For this purpose I have chosen impulse control/self-control. 
This subject matter represents a set of questions both neuroscience and the law have a vested interest 
in. It also represents an area where neuroscience can cause us to question responsibility without relying 
on a fully wrought deterministic thesis. The inability to control an impulse is as natural an excuse as 
they come and this is reflected in several areas of the law. I will now explain what I take impulse 
control to mean as well as outlining some of the known neural correlates. My view is in keeping with 
the general view of the field, though due to the abundance of the literature and the as of yet unsolved 
nature of impulse control there may be conflicting views in terms of the relative importance of each 
component of neurophysiology which I discuss. 
 
Subsection 1 - What Do We Mean By Impulse?: 
 As to the legal meaning of impulse, the definitions are drawn from cases and legislation where 
common sense tells us that self-control and the related concept of impulse control is an important 
aspect, like in addiction or provocation. I pause here to stress that impulse control is only one aspect of 
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self-control and as such the terms are not interchangeable. Self-control is the interaction between a 
constellation of capacities which includes impulse control but may be related to, for example, a motoric 
issue (such as Huntington's) which causes flailing or uncontrolled ballistic movements. This is certainly 
a problem of controlling one's behaivours but has nothing to do with impulse control. Furthermore 
someone may have a perceptual problem or balance issue which leads to uncontrolled movement, or a 
psychiatric disorder which causes delusions, or a disorder of empathy which makes it hard for that 
individual to conform their behaviours to the requirements of society or the law. All of the above 
examples are issues related to self-control, but don't hinge in particular on impulsive drives. 
 Thus the legal concepts which I investigate herein are chosen because while they are couched in 
terms of self-control the specific deficit which appears to be determinative is one related to the 
impulsive drives, or the inability to control those drives, experienced by those who come into conflict 
with the law. However, since accurately defining self-control in folk psychological terms has proven 
difficult, many jurisdictions including Canada have chosen to neglect further developing appropriate 
legal language and tests around volition. Instead they have suggested stretching already existing 
concepts like 'intention', 'knowledge', and 'appreciation' to excuse behaviour (Penney, 2014). As we will 
see, this attempt, while reasonable given the perceived difficulty of measuring and defining impulsivity, 
leads to inconsistencies which could be ameliorated by adapting neuroscience to study legally-defined 
impulse.  
 As an example of these definitional problems it is undeniable that someone who reacts 
immediately, emotionally, and/or habitually to a situation or with little regard to the consequences is 
acting impulsively, but such a reaction can manifest itself in many ways. The impulsivity can be a 
general impairment, such that the individual acts impulsively towards many stimuli {as is the case with 
many traumatic brain injury cases (Greve et al., 2001)}, but it can also be highly specific where the 
impulse to act is towards a particular substance {as in addiction (Bachara, 2005)}, or towards a certain 
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act {such as kleptomania or pathological gambling (Grant and Kim, 2003)}. Furthermore, the impulse 
can be brought on (and/or the ability to suppress the impulse itself being suppressed) by emotions 
which are themselves highly contingent on the individual and the context in which they find themselves 
(Bachara et al., 2000). This last concern with the impact of emotions on impulsivity has a great many 
layers and, when designing experiments, will require sensitivity to the social and cultural perspectives 
of the individual concerned as to how emotions should be appropriately used and managed. 
 Impulsiveness also doesn't necessarily mean that a person acted without thinking or without 
delaying their impulse to act. In drug addiction the addict can undertake significant deliberation about 
how to go about obtaining their substance of abuse and delay gratification until their plan has come to 
fruition. The aspect of this behaviour that makes it impulsive then isn't that the person does not 
deliberate, but that the impulse to act towards a particular stimuli is so strong that they are blind to 
other important factors in their decision to act. There may be just as much reason to question the 
responsibility of someone in this scenario as there is when the choice is made without deliberation, but 
these are certainly different types of impulsivity. 
 While the law has had difficulty dealing with these important but hard to measure differences, 
neuroscience has already begun to shed light. In animal models researchers have been able to dissociate 
impulsivity into several categories. The tests used to discover this differentiation are wonderfully 
simple. In one scenario a rat is put in a cage with two buttons, one will give a single food pellet 
immediately, while the other will give 5 food pellets but only after a delay. Which button the rat 
preferentially chooses is a measure of how good they are at delaying gratification, that is resisting the 
impulse for the immediate reward. In a similar scenario there is only one button which releases a single 
food pellet, but this time the rat is trained such that if they hear a tone on approaching the button they 
have to cancel the behavior. This experiment tests the ability of the rat to cancel an already initiated 
action. One can further test whether the animal can maintain a goal despite distracting stimuli. 
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 The most interesting result of all of these tests is that there isn't one group of rats who are good 
at all measures of impulse control and another that are not (Edmonds and Warburton, 2008). Instead 
some rats will be good at delayed gratification and cancellation, while others will be only good at one. 
Some might be good at those two but easily distracted from their goal. These results imply that the 
neural circuitry underlying these functions (if we maintain that behaviours are for the most and most 
significant part products of the brain or nervous system at large) are not all the same and that the 
functions are disassociable, that is they can be individually and predictably identified by using test 
which differ in small but significant ways. These results are precisely what studies of neural circuitry in 
these animals show (Winstanley et al., 2004). These same differentiable tendencies are no doubt 
represented in humans, and are likely important to consider when creating tests for criminal behaviour. 
Therefore, if we want to have legal standards which appropriately model behaviour we must develop 
language and tests which are capable of measuring not only the level to which one can control an 
impulse, but what type of impulsivity is relevant at the time of the crime. As we will see each of the 
types of cases I discuss throughout this work – Drug addiction, crimes of provocation, and mental 
disorders – are distinct in the type of impulse control deficits they display. 
 
Subsection 2 - The Anatomy of Impulse: 
 Neural correlates for motivation and impulse have been extensively studied. This research has 
allowed us to identify areas of the brain highly correlated to impulsive behaviours. The groundwork 
provided by these studies eases the task of finding neural correlates of relevant legal concepts. Since 
we know the rough locations of many of the important impulsivity networks we can much more easily 
extract the signal from the noise by using this knowledge to tune our detection methods. I will here 
briefly explain what is currently known about this anatomy and its relationship to motivation through 
an analysis of the neural circuitry related to addiction. Keep in mind that the actual circuitry is still 
being studied and thus a full picture is both impossible at this time as well as consisting of many books 
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worth of description. The following picture should be sufficient to communicate the basic ideas. 
 
Mechanisms of addiction: 
 Addiction and substance abuse have neural substrates which have been well classified. The 
major actors to pay attention to are the Meso-Limbic (reward) pathway and the Prefrontal Cortex 
(PFC). Drugs of abuse interface with the reward system of the brain found in the Meso-limbic pathway. 
In early addiction, taking a substance of abuse causes a significant increase in the release of dopamine 
from the Ventral Tegmental Area (VTA). Dopaminergic Axons (axons that release dopamine) from the 
VTA project, either directly or indirectly, to the Nucleus Accumbens (N. Acc), which is a major 
component of the Meso-Limbic pathway. 
  The N. Acc is an area important for integrating signals from all over the brain and gating 
behaviours, that is allowing a signal from the motor cortext to make it's way through the spine and 
peripheral nervous system to the muscles and from there to the outside world. When it receives the 
appropriate set of signals it influences, among other areas, the activity of the basal ganglia - a 
combination of deep brain regions important for controlling motoric behaviour (though they are 
suspected or shown to affect a litany of other functions). The usual functioning of this circuit is in 
learning. If an action is accompanied by a natural reward, for example food, water, or sex, then 
dopamine will be released. This causes the connections relating to the specific stimuli and context 
around this reward to be strengthened such that in the future one's motivation to act in the same way 
will be strengthened. This works both for actions (performing an action and getting a food item) or 
omissions (not approaching and receiving an award for doing so), and in both valances by encouraging 
movement away from negatively rewarding stimuli. 
 In the natural environment this process helps us to develop adaptive behaviours. If, for example, 
we have learned that by not eating a tasty food now we can acquire a larger proportion of it in the 
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future, then those with a properly adaptive reward system will wait for the larger reward. Projections 
from all over the brain converge on the N. Acc and the VTA to bring information about the nature of 
the reward. Studies, the most famous being the Mischel Marshmallow experiment, suggest that those 
with better abilities to consciously control impulses have better outcomes in society and social standing 
(Mischel et al., 1972). 
 Drugs of abuse are addictive specifically because they can bypass this normal learning process 
and interface directly with the reward circuitry. Some drugs, like cocaine, will act in an excitatory 
manner, increasing the amount of dopamine activity by directly activating dopamine receptors in the N. 
Acc. Cocaine will also decrease dopamine reuptake by the axon which released it. Opiates have an 
inhibitory function, but act to inhibit those neurons which themselves inhibit dopamine release, thus 
increasing dopamine activity within the Meso-Limbic Pathway. 
 Over time our brains learn and adapt. The neurons affected by drugs of abuse will regulate their 
dopamine receptors and neurotransmitter vesicles such that the same amount of drug leads to less 
dopaminergic activity. Part and parcel of this learning is altered connections between both the frontal 
cortex and the N. Acc, and the locus of activity within the basal ganglia. 
 Before addiction, connections between the medial PFC and the N. Acc are key to controlling the 
impulse to take a drug. The PFC is known as the executive part of the brain because it regulates which 
stimuli to pay attention to and which actions should be performed or avoided. Once addiction starts 
taking place, however, the inhibitory connections from the PFC which would dampen the dopaminergic 
activity in the N. Acc lose their strength. Furthermore, connections from the PFC which drive 
behaviours associated with acquiring and taking the substance of abuse are stronger. 
 The activity within the basal ganglia also changes. Before addiction, behaviours related to the 
substance of abuse tended to cause activity within the ventral parts of the basal ganglia. This is 
common in rewarding behaviours over which we have significant cognitive control. After dependence, 
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however, drug stimuli tend to cause activity in the more dorsal regions of the basal ganglia, which are 
associated with unconscious habit formation. All of the above information is available in any number of 
good neuroscience textbooks (Kandel et al., 2014). 
 How we act in any given scenario is determined by a fine balance of activity between the 
evolutionarily older limbic and basal ganglia structures, which underlay emotions and subconscious 
impulses, and the evolutionarily newer PFC underlying our rational behaviours (a rough but true 
approximation). If a drug of abuse is taken repeatedly, then this balance will shift away from a multi-
targeted executive control and towards subconscious and single-minded impulses to continue activities 
which are associated with drug taking. 
 The case with impulse control disorders related to, for example traumatic brain injury or Fronto-
Temporal Dementia, is a slightly different one. In these cases the individual may have pristine basal 
ganglia and limbic activity but some traumatic event or organic disease has caused significant damage 
to their PFC. As such the control and direction once exercised by the PFC becomes shifted or 
eliminated. A person with a traumatic brain injury could lose the ability to control impulses (a common 
symptom) but they may further develop talents in a direction which previously held no interest. (Miller 
et al., 1998; Gordon, 2005) 
 Equally important is that all of the topics discussed above have functional and structural 
correlates which can be non-invasively measured. Many of them already have been studied, though 
these studies are usually conducted on groups which makes it difficult to apply the results to 
individuals. Such studies remain useful because they provide targets for the kind of individual 
longitudinal studies, as well as the explicitly neural criteria for legal definitions, which I will discuss in 
the next chapter. 
 
Chapter Conclusion: 
 In Chapter 2 we’ve explored how the law creates models, how evidence can be used to prove 
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the components of those models, and how neuroscience can provide sufficient proof by correlating 
structural and functional scan results with mental and physical states the law cares about. These ideas 
aren't fully novel. Functional and structural correlates to mental and physical phenomena are the basis 
of much neuroscience research. The idea has even been applied to the law. Structural scans have been 
used for decades to bolster claims of cognitive deficit, such as using an X-Ray to demonstrate traumatic 
brain injury caused by a car crash (Koshbin and Koshbin, 2007). 
 Functional scans have also been employed. There is a developing case law around using fMRI 
techniques to indicate deception (See: United States v. Semrau and Wilson v. Corestaff Services, L.P.) 
and psychopathy. Brain fingerprinting, a technique reminiscent of the commonly accepted DNA 
fingerprinting, uses EEG to correlate different brain activities to different mental states. EEG 
fingerprinting doesn't rely on a causal mechanism (that is it doesn't give a full start to finish cause and 
effect account) and only detects differences in results related to different stimuli. It amounts to saying 
that we know there is a detectable difference, but not why that difference exists. For example, an 
experimenter could present 100 images of landscapes to someone undergoing an fMRI scan and record 
that activity. The experimenter can then show them 100 images consisting of 90 novel landscapes and 
10 from the old set and record the activity. It turns out that, depending on the magnitude of the 
difference between how a the brain reacts to old and new images, the experimenter can identify with 
good accuracy which pictures had been seen before based on the recording alone even if the subject had 
no conscious memory of that scene (Rissman et al. 2010). 
 In the next chapter I will be looking at actual statutes within Canadian law. After a description 
of each I will outline both the work that has already been done and the ideal future experiments that 
could help us either in writing statues, interpreting them, or meeting their stated judicial objectives. 
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Chapter 3: Applications Of Neuroscience To The Laws Concerning Impulse 
 
“Considering how long society has been at it, you'd expect a better job. But the campaigns have been 
badly planned and the victory has never been secure. The behaviour of the individual has been shaped 
according to revelations of 'good conduct,' never as the result of experimental study. But why not 
experiment? The questions are simple enough. What's the best behaviour for an individual so far as the 
group is concerned? And how can the individual be induced to behave in that way? Why not explore 
those questions in a scientific spirit?” 
- BF Skinner, Walden Two, 1948 
 
Section 1 – Introduction: 
 In this chapter I will be exploring how the neuroscience of impulse control can contribute to the 
creation of laws, the trying of cases, and the sentencing of criminals. I have chosen to concentrate on 
the criminal law because impulse control is important to our concept of responsibility, which is a 
subject of particular importance within the criminal law and its justifications for applying punishments 
or restorative efforts. (Lacey and Pickard, 2013; Pickard and Pearce, 2013)  
 I have chosen to explore legal concepts which are either already functional within Canadian 
criminal law or which could be based on reasonable extensions of currently accepted arguments. These 
arguments can be found within a cluster of laws and cases related to self-control and impulse control, 
namely crimes concerning controlled substances, crimes of provocation and other defenses, and mental 
health law.  
 In the first section on creating laws, I will touch on how the connection between addiction and 
responsibility can gain greater clarity through incorporating a neuroscience lens. In the section on trials 
I contend that the reasoning found within current legal interpretations should extend to include the 
complete defense of irresistible impulse as well as the partial defense of diminished responsibility. 
Finally, in the section on sentencing I will explore how meeting our sentencing objectives can be aided 
by paying heed to neuroscience. 
 
Section 2 – Creation of Legislation: 
 
Subsection 1: Laws Concerning Controlled Substances. 
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 Addiction and substances of abuse are obviously an area of human life in which the law has 
taken a special interest. A significant number of Canadian laws exist in order to categorize various 
substances and to limit their production, sale, transportation, and possession. These laws share much of 
their rationale with those passed in the United States, as well as those found in international agreements 
(Erickson, 1992; Pietschmann, 2006). The modern criminal approach to addiction has been criticized 
for taking a harsh stance on what should ultimately be a public health issue (Goldberg, 2011; UN 
Global Commission on Drug Policy, 2011). While public health is certainly an aim of the law, it is but 
one among several considerations when making substances illegal. 
 I contend that one of the primary reasons a retributive justice based approach (and not one 
based in public health concerns) has been so universally used is the difficulty in determining via 
objective evidence who is actually addicted (and thus would qualify for some level of therapeutic 
assistance) and who is simply using substances of abuse for monetary gain. Those in the latter category 
are (at least under the current regime of justice) clear candidates for retributive justice, while those in 
the former category are clear candidates for a therapeutic approach. There are clear cases that current 
approaches, such as psychiatric evaluation, have been able to identify and directed towards drug courts. 
The evidence of the prevalence and incidence of drug addiction and impulsive disorders in the prison 
population, however, imply that the current approaches are far from perfect (Fazel et al, 2006). While 
some of this shortfall is certainly due to limited application of psychiatric assessment, there are surely 
other cases where subconscious impulsivity is the determinative element in substance abuse but which 
are not discernible through standard evaluative means. 
 
The Controlled Drugs and Substances Act: 
 The drug laws in Canada are enumerated in a piece of legislation called the Controlled Drugs 
and Substances Act (CDSA). This document categorizes various substances into one of eight schedules, 
with greater penalties the smaller the schedule number. It also lays out the elements of possession 
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(CDSA s4), possession with the intent to traffic (CDSA s5), importing and exporting (CDSA s6), and 
production (CDSA s7), as well as punishment guidelines for each of these offenses depending on the 
schedule of the drug in question. Part of the purpose of these laws is to control substances which lead to 
substance dependence and which have a large social cost (See: Order Amending Schedule I to the 
Controlled Drugs and Substances Act).  
 
Neuroscience and scheduling: 
 Addiction and substance abuse provide such an appropriate subject because they straddle the 
line between something which can be described in either behavioural or in neuroscientific terms. A 
perfect example of this is the classification system used in the DSM-V (the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders 5), the reference book for the disorders currently recognized by psychiatry. 
The DSM classifies addiction under substance use/abuse disorders and defines it in terms of 
behavioural criteria, but the disorders are organized into those relating to specific substances (cocaine, 
cannabis, opiates) which have been well described in terms of their interaction with our neuroanatomy 
(See: DSM-5 Substance-Related and Addictive Disorders), (Kandel et al, 2014). This approach in the 
DSM-V demonstrates that psychiatry, the major field on which the law relies in order to provide 
evidence of important mental states, is taking a hybrid approach to categorizing these disorders from 
which the law could well profit.  
Both the DSM-5 and the CDSA offer little by way of objective standards for determining the 
addictive or dangerous potential of a substance of abuse, especially when applied on an individual 
level. Some individuals will find certain substances more rewarding (that is, they cause more powerful 
activation of their neurocircuitry sensitive to rewarding stimuli) than others, and there is no obvious 
way to predict how addictive behaviours will manifest without observing such behaviours in a 
population. Furthermore, different drugs which might be equally addictive (that is equally powerful in 
activating our impulse related neurocircuitry) can have drastically different behavioural outcomes. For 
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example, a stimulant (like amphetamine) and a depressant (like heroin) may both lead to dependence 
but to drastically different lifestyles and behaviours. Neuroscience, by defining addictive potential and 
dangerousness via the activity and structure of certain neuroanatomy, should be able to help with 
creating more appropriate legal classifications. 
 
Neuroscientific Criteria for Scheduling: 
 Recall the section on the anatomy of addiction in the previous chapter. Any drug of abuse, or for 
that matter any rewarding activity, is mediated through this anatomy. This knowledge fashions us with 
excellent criteria for making decisions about how harshly to punish offences related to particular 
substances. 
 Reasoning from a public health starting point leads one to assume that the drugs we want to 
control to the highest degree are those which are either the most addictive, or have the worst long term 
health effects, or both. Both of these factors have measurable neural correlates. We can use cell culture, 
animal models, and functional scans of humans to assess these variables. 
 
Animal Models: 
 Most of what we know about the brain's reward circuitry has come from animal models. In 
these experiments an animal is given some substance, often accompanied by a behavioural task. Then 
brain activity is measured directly either via electrical activity and/or dopamine release.  
  The addictiveness of any given substance is going to be related to: 1) the amount of dopamine a 
certain amount of drug given in a certain way can release, 2), the change in the connections of PFC, or, 
3), the location of the basal ganglia activity. Based on this knowledge we have some solid criteria for 
determining the addictiveness of a substance of abuse (Hyman, 2007). A combination of these elements 
can then be reflected in which schedule the substance is classified under. 
 Furthermore, similar experiments could be used to study if there is any long term neurological 
damage associated with taking a certain substance. It is not necessarily true that the more addictive a 
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drug is the more likely it is to cause damage and therefore future impairment. Sectioning the brain of an 
animal can allow us to make counts of neurons and of receptor density, both measures of brain damage. 
 
Human Experiments: 
 Human functional imaging experiments can be used to measure variables related to addiction in 
a non-invasive or minimally invasive way. PET scans which use radioactively labeled dopamine allow 
us to measure the density of dopamine receptors distributed throughout the brain (Volkow et al., 2014). 
Several of these scans taken over time can reveal how this density changes, which is an indirect 
measure of the addictive potential of a drug. Structural MRI scans can be used in a similar vein to see if 
the parts of the neuroanatomy related to substance of abuse are shrinking or changing in shape, which 
could be a measure of damage (Chang et al., 2007). Similar scans like Diffusion Tensor Imaging (DTI) 
can be used to study the changes to axonal connections both within the meso-limbic pathway as well as 
between the PFC and the N. Acc (Hanlon and Canterberry, 2012). 
 fMRI also allows us to study how the brain is connected. If we look at the oscillations of 
activity, the rate at which our measure of neural metabolic activity oscillates between higher and lower 
values, we can assume that areas oscillating in a similar fashion elsewhere in the brain are in some way 
connected (Greicius et al., 2003). Since we know that stimuli related to a particular drug of abuse 
causes craving for that drug (a picture of a needle for heroin, for example), if we pair a scan with the 
presentation of drug related stimuli we can measure how the activity in the PFC, Meso-Limbic 
pathway, and basal ganglia changes with this presentation. Depending on how long the individual has 
taken the drug, how often, and by what route of administration, we can draw conclusions about how 
that frequency of administration of that particular drug influences the activity of the brain (Goldstein 
and Volkow, 2002; Hester and Garavan, 2004). 
 
Conclusion: 
 All of the information discussed above would be useful in classifying the dangerousness and 
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addictive potential of substances. It would likely be a significantly better alternative to the commonly 
used analog criteria, which make a novel substance illegal if it has a chemical similarity to a previously 
scheduled substance {See: Order Amending Schedule I to the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act 
(MDPV)}. Such evidence would further provide a part of an objective component to the rubric by 
which substances can be scheduled, which should force some clarification on the more subjective 
classification criteria. 
 
Subsection 2: Mental Disorder And Irresistible Impulse. 
 This subsection investigates the possibility of developing a control-related variant of the mental 
disorder defense. The mental disorder defense is currently enshrined in Section 16 of the Criminal 
Code. Someone can use this defense only if, at the time of the crime, they were unable to ‘appreciate’ 
the nature and consequence of their actions. While this is surely an important criteria for reducing or 
removing criminal responsibility it is clearly not the only relevant criterion. If someone were to 
appreciate the consequences of their actions and yet found him/herself powerless to abstain, then there 
seems to be just as much reason to question responsibility. 
 Due to this reasoning some jurisdictions have included a 'control test' as a branch of the mental 
disorder defense. The legislation in the state of Maryland reads: 
“Because of a mental disorder or mental retardation, [he] lacks substantial capacity to: [1] appreciate 
the criminality of that conduct; or [2] conform that conduct to the requirements of law.” 
 
 
 Part [2] here provides the grounding for the control test. Morse details the control test as itself 
having two sub-branches (Morse, 1994). Under one sub-branch the defendant must have undergone an 
overwhelming force such that they were compelled to act. Under the other the defendant was presented 
with an extremely difficult choice that prevents the actor from having a “reasonable alternative”. 
Neuroscience and a Control Test: 
 The greatest contribution neuroscience can make to crafting irresistible impulse legislation is to 
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continue exploring the neural correlates of impulsive behaviour in the natural environment and in 
relation to currently used psychological tests for impulsivity and volition. This evidence can then be 
used to bolster the claims of psychiatrists that there are indeed specific disorders which completely 
hinder volition, and that these disorders are specific to certain situations and stimuli. Kleptomania 
would probably qualify along with extreme cases of Pyromania, Bipolar Disorder, types of 
Schizophrenia, and Compulsive Gambling. There is strong evidence to suggest that there are 
individuals who might be fully conscious of the consequences of their actions but nonetheless would be 
powerless to stop performing them (Donohue et al., 2008). Whether or not we want to legally excuse 
this type of behaviour is the type of ethical question we'll be examining in Chapter 4. 
 
Subsection 3: Diminished Responsibility/Capacity Defenses. 
 There is another way that impulse can be empowered as a legal concept. Some jurisdictions 
have created a partial defense known as either a Diminished Responsibility or Diminished Capacity 
defense. In these jurisdictions this defense is most often used to reduce murder to manslaughter. Unlike 
the complete defense of mental disorder, diminished responsibility is a partial defense which mitigates 
an element of the Crown's case. While Canada does not currently explicitly accept a diminished 
responsibility defense, there are laws on the books which are highly related if not completely logically 
contiguous with it. An example is the law relating to crimes of provocation. The law for provocation is 
outlined in s. 232 of the Criminal Code of Canada and is as follows: 
 
“232. (1) Culpable homicide that otherwise would be murder may be reduced to manslaughter if the 
person who committed it did so in the heat of passion caused by sudden provocation. 
What is provocation 
(2) A wrongful act or an insult that is of such a nature as to be sufficient to deprive an ordinary 
person of the power of self-control is provocation for the purposes of this section if the accused 
acted on it on the sudden and before there was time for his passion to cool. 
Questions of fact 
(3) For the purposes of this section, the questions 
 (a) whether a particular wrongful act or insult amounted to provocation, and 
 (b) whether the accused was deprived of the power of self-control by the provocation 
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that he alleges he received,” 
 
 With the defense of provocation, which is a partial defense just like diminished responsibility, 
the offense of murder is mitigated such that the accused is convicted of manslaughter instead (Roach, 
2011; Criminal Code C-46 s232). The crucial wording in this statute is that the provocation must be 
“sufficient to deprive an ordinary person of self-control”. This section makes no overtures to the 
rational state of the individual and instead is grounded in language of behavioural control of which 
impulse control is an important component. If the law had sufficient resolution to have different 
explicit types of Actus Reus you could reason that this element of the offence was partially mitigated. 
Unfortunately no such provision currently exists within the law and must instead be inferred.  
 This is not, however, because such a model is impossible or illogical. Neuroscience, Psychiatry, 
and Psychology have demonstrated that it is certainly the case that there are different kinds and levels 
of volutariness and impulse control. Other aspects of Canadian Law also already imply such 
distinctions. For example, the currently acceptable common law defenses of Duress, Necessity, and 
Self-Defense cause us to question not just whether the person had the right rational capacities when 
committing the act but whether they were acting in a truly voluntary fashion. 
 The diminished responsibility defense could be useful in many areas of the law outside of 
reducing Murder to Manslaughter. Any time a crime is committed and the defense can bring up a 
reasonable doubt that the accused was fully responsible for their actions, then they could instead be 
convicted of a version of the crime which reflects this reduced level of responsibility. This would 
imbue the law with a greater resolution and flexibility when ascribing criminal liability. A major aspect 
of the reasoning behind having a provocation defense is that the accused doesn't deserve the stigma of a 
murder conviction. It seems right that individuals with impulse issues should also deserve less stigma 
than is currently afforded by Canadian law. 
 The most important differences between the irresistible impulse defense discussed in the 
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previous subsection and the diminished responsibility defense discussed above are in: one, the kinds of 
differences in volitional control to which they are sensitive, and two, which parts of the current law of 
Canada they are building upon. The irresistible impulse defense, if met, completely removes 
responsibility (there is no sliding scale) and builds upon laws and decisions which rely on a complete 
absence of volitional control. The arguments for irresistible impulse are logically connected with the 
current mental disorder defense and import into this framework the idea that someone who is acting on 
an impulse they were powerless to resist is acting in a way for which they are at least as not responsible 
as those accepted cases which rely on a lack of rational appreciation. 
 The diminished responsibility defense, on the other hand, implies partial levels of volition and 
responsibility and is a logical extension of those parts of Canadian law which recognize this type of 
partial volition, namely the provocation defense (s. 232 of the Criminal Code). For example an 
addicted individual acting on the strong impulse to acquire drugs of abuse is unlikely to have been 
completely powerless to resist the impulse. In this case it would make no sense to apply an irresistible 
impulse defense. If the state, however, wants to recognize that this person is acting in a less voluntary 
fashion than non-addicted individuals who acquire drugs of abuse for the purposes of trafficking then 
having a defense which recognizes this difference makes sense. 
Both diminished responsibility and the control test would rely on similar kinds of evidence from 
neuroscience (behavioural tests combined with evidence of functional and structural abnormalities), 
however the standard which must be met will be different. While a person who successfully meets the 
standards of the control test would escape all elements of a charge those who meet the standard for the 
diminished responsibility defense would only have one element mitigated. The ultimate effect of both 
of these defenses would be a more precise recognition by the law of the different kinds of impulse 
control. It is important to remember, however, that they are not equivalent. How these differences cash 
out in an actual judicial context is explored in the next section. 
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Section 3: Impulse on Trial 
 Now that we have become familiar with how the law models behaviour, and the importance of 
impulse to those models, it is time to look at the trial process. Much of this section will be hypothetical 
as the measures outlined above have not been incorporated into Canadian law. Neither an irresistible 
impulse branch of s. 16 in the Criminal Code, nor a diminished responsibility defense, is currently 
available. In this section I will consider two things: the role neuroscience would play in a trial if these 
defenses were available and some Canadian legal philosophy relating to the different ways these tests 
could apply. 
 
Subsection 1: Irresistible Impulse In A Trial Context. 
 If someone in Canada wants to avail of the mental disorder defense as it is currently used the 
court has to rely on evidence presented by forensic psychiatrists. This evidence can either take the form 
of a psychiatrist interviewing the accused and applying behavioural tests, or it can take the form of a 
psychiatrist’s interpretation of past behaviour suggested by other evidence. A combination of these 
approaches allows the psychiatrist to classify the accused as having certain deficiencies which meet the 
legal criteria for insanity, which currently only includes being unable to rationally appreciate the 
consequences or the moral wrongness of their actions. 
 If this standard is met the subject will almost certainly then be classified as having a mental 
disorder with reference to the most recent DSM. In cases of schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, other 
mood disorders, compulsions, and disorders brought about by injury rational capacities can be seriously 
impaired (Donohue et al., 2008). The mainstay of the psychiatric evaluation is the interview about, and 
analysis of, past behaviours and thoughts, particularly those around the time of the crime. Through 
these interviews the psychiatrist can develop a model of the accused's mental state at the time of the 
crime. Delusions, command hallucinations, and severe shifts in mood can all be reasons to seriously 
question someone's ability to rationally understand the action they are taking and the consequences of 
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that action. 
 Along with the interview, and looking at past behaviours, tests have been developed to 
investigate the specific nature of the mental deficit. Answers and reactions to different proposed 
scenarios and abstract concepts within these tests can help define the nature of the individual's 
impairment (Donohue et al., 2008). The results would then be combined with the rest of the 
behavioural evidence and the psychiatrist would give an opinion, based on their experience, as to 
whether the accused meets that jurisdiction's definition of mental disorder. 
 In jurisdictions where a control branch of the mental disorder defense is allowed, such as in 
Maryland, evidence works much the same way. The facts of the case, the interview, and the tests given 
in the interview all form the basis for the psychiatrist's testimony that the relevant capacities were 
inhibited at the time of the crime. Evidence suggests that very few people when assessed for being not 
criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder (NCR for short) are determined to be so on the 
basis of volitional impairment alone (Donohue et al., 2008; Penney, 2013). Most of the time these 
subjects meet the criteria for both rational as well as volitional impairment, that is, they are unable 
either to rationally appreciate the nature of their action or to resist performing the action. 
 
The Contribution Of Current Neuroscience: 
 There is reason to believe that neuroscience can be useful in making these difficult 
determinations. Structural imaging revealing neural damage has been used for decades as evidence to 
corroborate a functional impairment (Khoshbin and Khoshbin, 2007). It has been recently put forward 
in a sentencing trial, albeit unsuccessfully, to corroborate the claim that a defendant was psychopathic, 
and thus had a greater difficulty in conforming their activities to the requirements of the law. (Phillips, 
2013). 
 I am careful throughout this work to restrict my claims to how neuroscience might corroborate 
the claims of psychiatrists as opposed to assign a truth value to those claims. I do this for several 
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reasons, the first is an ancient legal principle which states that no piece of evidence may take the place 
of the finder of fact when answering 'ultimate questions'. By this it is meant that for questions such as: 
Is this person a trustworthy witness? Did this person have meaningful responsibility which allows us to 
assign criminal culpability? Or is this person guilty of this crime? That is the questions which would de 
facto answer the question the trial is attempting to answer. 
 This is the nature of psychiatric testimony as well. While the opinion of the psychiatrist is taken 
as an important element of the case it cannot by itself determine whether or not the person was 
responsible. Instead their statements must be considered by the finder of fact and they must decide 
whether the conclusions meet the legal definitions and burdens. This state of affairs may not always be 
the case of course. If a test came out which could infallibly, or nearly so, show that someone was lying, 
or was unable to control their actions, then the law may have to change to subordinate these questions 
such that they are no longer ultimate. Matching someone to a biological sample through DNA 
fingerprinting is an example of a scientific techniques which has essentially finally answered the 
question of whether or not a sample came from such and such a person (though this isn't really an 
'ultimate question'). 
 So, keeping this distinction in mind, alongside structural scan results experiments have also 
been performed that use functional imaging. Several studies of schizophrenia reveal that there are 
statistically significant functional indicators of certain forms of schizophrenia (Hill et al., 2004). A 
litany of data exists from fMRI and other EEG studies exploring addiction as well as disorders like 
ADHD, both of which have a significant interaction with impulse control (Yu-Feng et al., 2007).  
 The main issue with using these results is that it is uncertain how they relate to the specific legal 
criteria and how easily they can be used on individual subjects. To be truly useful in a legal context 
these neuroscientific methods would have to maintain sufficient ecological validity. Ecological validity 
equates to how well the results from the experiment relate to the behaviour of the phenomenon being 
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studied in the real world. To have perfect ecological validity the experiments would require no 
abstracted translation into the real world. For example dropping a rock in a lab to study the acceleration 
caused by gravity has near perfect generalizablity to the rest of the world (accounting for high 
mountains, deep trenches, and air densities) and thus has excellent ecological validity. For investigating 
legal phenomena then the experiment would have to be performed on single subjects, as criminal 
proceedings generally concern one or a few individuals, and would have to have as its aim the 
identification of volitional deficits pertaining to the context of the crime. It is this concept of ecological 
validity I invoke when I speak of 'appropriate use'. 
 Unfortunately neuroscience studies usually draw their results from group averaged data and are 
performed in a laboratory or hospital context. Group averaging data is an excellent way of increasing 
the signal to noise ratio, but since no individual brain looks or acts exactly like a group averaged brain 
the information proves of limited use. Furthermore it is exceedingly difficult to say how the brain 
activity related to a task performed while in a controlled environment relates to brain activity in a 
natural environment. These two difficulties together present the greatest hurdle to creating a 
neuroscience useful to the law. 
Developing a More Useful Neuroscience: 
 A new type of approach could be developed capitalizing on existing neurotechnologies which 
would maximize ecological validity. In order to be relevant to the court this approach would have to 
pay special attention to both individual differences in activity as well as context dependent differences 
in activity. Thus, the neuroscientific evaluation must take place on the individual level and in as close 
to the natural environment as possible. 
The neuroscientific experiments should also be designed such that the evidence produced is 
relevant to both the specific circumstances of the case and to the particular legal criteria of mental 
disorder. The behavioural tests and tasks given while undergoing the functional scans should be either 
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as much of a replication of the circumstances of the crime as possible or have extremely good 
arguments about why the capacities investigated by the test are relevant to that circumstance. 
The conclusions based on such evidence should be carefully worded such that they remain 
corroborating evidence of a behavioural assessment. The neuroscience evidence should not take 
precedence simply because it is a novel 'brain based' approach. The trier of fact must be informed that 
the results of such a test do not make the psychiatrist's claim fundamentally 'true'. Instead, the test 
results would, when supplied with an appropriately strong argument, simply provide further 
corroborating evidence for that opinion. 
 
Structural Testing: 
 Structural and functional imaging may allow just such an advance. Structural scans can reveal 
relative sizes of brain structures, which by itself may corroborate a theory. Structural imaging would be 
even more useful if they could be performed at multiple time points. If the accused has ever had a brain 
scan before for a medical reason related to their impulsivity then these records could allow a 
comparison of the relative sizes of certain structures over time. It is becoming increasingly possible and 
popular to perform CAT scans or MRIs when a structural abnormality is suspected. This evidence 
would not be determinative and would certainly be open to criticism, but could prove useful. 
 A structural scan may also allow for the detection of any abnormality, such as a tumor, which 
could interfere with impulse control. The now famous Burns and Swerdlow case, where a tumor caused 
a man to act sexually towards his step-daughter, is a perfect example (Burns and Swerdlow, 2003). 
 
 
Functional Testing Design: 
 Keeping in mind the concerns about specific relevance, how might a properly designed 
functional experiment work? Let's use the example of schizophrenia. Someone is being charged with 
destruction of property because they destroyed their neighbour’s satellite dish (an example borrowed 
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from Morse) (Donohue et al., 2008). It comes out before the trial that this individual has a history of 
psychosis. The individual also has a persistent and unwanted paranoia that any satellite dish can read 
their thoughts. Assume that they are fully aware that there is no reason to believe the dish can read 
mind and that such thoughts are caused by their disease, as well as being aware of the physical, moral, 
and legal consequences of their action. None the less they were put in such a position by their mental 
disorder, perhaps to the point of existential terror, that they felt they had no choice but to destroy the 
dish. 
 Currently this person wouldn't qualify for a mental disorder defense. Because they knew the 
consequences of their actions and knew that their paranoia was an effect of their disorder they would be 
nothing less than fully responsible for their actions. But, given their disorder, it is quite likely that they 
were unable to resist the impulse to destroy the dish due to something like extreme discomfort. In view 
of this inability, and the fundamental importance of volition to responsibility, I along with several legal 
scholars would argue that the person should have full access to the mental disorder defense.    
Neuroscientific evidence to support the use of this defense could be produced in the following 
way: the psychiatrist would apply a functional scan while the subject was experiencing something as 
close as possible to the actual event. If the scan occurs in a laboratory it could be an fMRI while 
wearing a virtual reality headset. The device would take recordings while the subject is exposed to 
various stimuli and asked questions. First they could be exposed to an innocuous object to get a 
baseline. Then various different objects that related to satellite dishes in one way or another. First a 
radio antenna, then a dish made of wood, eventually leading up to exposure to the actual object of the 
subject’s paranoia. 
 During the whole test the psychiatrist would both ask questions and make careful notes with 
time stamps about the person's current mind state (i.e. feeling safe, feeling unsettled, feeling the need to 
smash the dish, etc) as well as their observable behaviour (i.e. whether they appeared to be unsettled or 
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comfortable). A video recording of the whole event could also prove useful to note reactions that may 
have been missed in real time. 
 Back in the lab the data would be subjected to analysis. Work would be done to correlate 
patterns of activation to events of interest, for example, when the person said they were comfortable 
versus paranoid, exposed to innocuous stimuli versus active stimuli, feeling the urge to destroy the 
stimui versus feeling okay while in its presence. Of particular importance would be any activity 
correlated to times when the person appeared to be particularly uncomfortable and expressed a desire to 
do anything but be in the presence of the stimuli being presented. 
 After this analysis it may appear that there were patterns of activity specific to these scenarios. 
Further these correlations could be strengthened by filtering them through the correlations we are 
scientifically confident about. An example would be if there was a decrease in frontal activation, an 
increase in limbic activation both in terms of reward (meso-limbic) and emotion, or an increase in some 
central indicator relating to the activation of the peripheral sympathetic nervous system (the fight or 
flight reaction), when the person wanted to destroy the stimuli. 
 If such results could be obtained they could be quite convincing as corroboration of a 
psychiatrist’s claim that when this person encounters this stimuli they are unable to conform to the 
requirements of the law and therefore qualify under the mental disorder defense. In borderline cases, or 
in cases where the accused is performing a highly skilled ruse, the psychiatrist might only feel 
confident in such a determination with the addition of the neurotechnological evidence. 
 
Subsection 2 - Diminished Responsibility on Trial: 
 The defense of diminished responsibility relies only on showing that there is reason to believe 
the accused was not fully responsible for their behaviour, which, depending on the context, may be 
easier than showing that the person was completely helpless either because of compulsion or through 
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unreasonable choice. 
 In cases of drug possession, at least three types of people come into contact with law 
enforcement: the ones who sell, the ones who use casually, and addicts. Naturally accessible behaviours 
may not be enough to determine which one is which, so it might be best to play it safe and apply the 
same verdict to all. It is indeed currently the case that a criminal charge depends largely on how much 
of the illegal substance is in possession of the accused, no matter what use that quantity is actually 
going to be put to (See: CDSA S4-S7). However if the law can tell the difference between these groups 
through the use of neurotechnologies, it makes sense that it should attempt to gain such resolution. An 
appropriate testing design could very well do just that. Whether or not these techniques would identify 
a large number of people or a small number is important, but for the moment is almost beside the point. 
It is the duty of lawyers, judges, and law makers to identify injustices and to take steps to ameliorate 
them. This idea is putout in its fullest and best form by Amartya Sen in The Idea of Justice (Sen, 2011). 
 
 
Structural Scanning: 
 Structural scanning would be useful in a way analogous to that discussed for irresistible 
impulse. These scans could prove useful in uncovering an injury or abnormality which could cause 
impulse issues. Traumatic brain injury, for example, is often associated with impulse control problems 
(Greve et al., 2001).  
 Another way would be for an accused to undergo one scan on their first offence and another for 
every subsequent offence. This strategy is the same layout as a longitudinal study conducted in research 
centers today. Longitudinal data would allow courts and law enforcement to make note of changes in 
structure, and to correlate structural changes with observed behavioural changes 
' 
Functional Scanning: 
 A very similar approach could be applied which leverages functional imaging technologies. 
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Functional imaging is the converse of structural imaging and reveals correlates of ongoing brain 
activity with little information as to structure. Functional imaging from previous hospital visits would 
likely be of limited use because the results and conclusions depend on the type of behaviour being 
assessed, which is unlikely to be exactly that which is relevant to some criminal act. Scans taken after 
every offence and related to the nature of the offence could prove quite useful by showing that external 
behaviours are reflected in, and therefore corroborated by, the internal workings of the brain. 
 To conduct such a test on someone with drug related impulse issues would look much like the 
test for irresistible impulse discussed above. Drugs or drug related paraphernalia would be presented to 
the person either in real life or in virtual form. Careful notes would be taken of all behaviours and times 
of occurrence. Then the brain activity at those times could be compared with those at innocuous times 
and the results filtered through our current knowledge of causal neural mechanisms. While this strategy 
is not a diagnostic test which is able to prove that the person was hampered in their ability to control an 
impulse, it could well provide evidence which further allows potentially addicted persons to be 
distinguished from normal individuals. 
 
Conclusion: 
 It is unknown how well experimental observations would relate to our legal definitions as the 
experiments have not yet been done. The law is also limited by the resources and technologies to which 
each jurisdiction has access. However such efforts as those described above, if performed carefully, 
could produce usefully predictive corroborating evidence for the diagnoses and testimony of 
psychiatrists. 
 
Section 4 – Sentencing and Neuroscience: 
 It is unknown how well experimental observations would relate to our legal definitions. The 
relevant experiments have not yet been done. However such efforts as those described above, if 
performed carefully, could produce usefully predictive corroborating evidence for the diagnoses and 
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testimony of psychiatrists. 
 
Subsection 1 - Sentencing and The Criminal Code of Canada: 
 The Criminal Code of Canada outlines the purposes and principles of sentencing for criminal 
offences as well as provisions which allow the case to be dealt with by alternative measures. 
 The sections of the Criminal Code I will be concentrating on are: Section 718, Subsections (b), (d), 
and (f), Section 718.1, Section 718.2, Subsection (a), clause (iii.1), and Subsections (b), (d), and (e). 
 
Section 718, Subsection (b): 
 Section 718 deals with the purposes and objectives of sentences. Subsection (b) reads that one 
objective is to “deter the offender and other persons from committing offences”. This subsection 
separates deterrence into specific deterrence of the offender and general deterrence of the population. 
 The potential applicability of neuroscience to specific deterrence is promising. If we accept that 
consideration of the laws and punishments likely to occur if the offender is caught is a rational 
deliberative process, then we can inquire into how this individual's brain responds to certain stimuli and 
correlate these with behavioural observations. When presented with drug related stimuli, for example, 
one could see a marked change in activity related to reward. This change could further be accompanied 
by alterations in activity related to decreased conscious deliberation (likely in decreased frontal 
activity). If this data is combined with behavioural observations related to susceptibility to impulsive 
action and addiction, which is roughly the technique which we currently employ when a psychiatrist 
assesses someone for addictive traits, we might well be able to conclude to a greater certainty that the 
likelihood of conscious deliberation when faced with drug related stimuli is lower for one person then 
for another.  
 Using neurotechnologies in this way to probe brain activity would be especially effective if used 
on a repeat offender where the circumstances which lead to their re-offending are sufficiently clear. If 
there is evidence that the offender deliberated about how to go about obtaining a substance then scans 
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sensitive to immediate impulse wouldn't be useful. If, instead, the evidence suggested the defendant 
was enticed by circumstance preying on their impulsive tendencies then a functional scan might be able 
to add weight to this evidence, and we could be clearer on what part specific deterrence should play in 
sentencing this individual. 
 There is already some case law close to on point. In R v. Preston, Wood JA sentenced a 
defendant convicted of three counts of heroin possession to a suspended sentence which included 
rehabilitation and community service. His reasoning was that this sentence was the only way to “break 
the cycle of crime” (R v. Preston). This reference clearly has both a rehabilitative as well as specific 
deterrence objective. This case is also a good example of someone who was unable to control impulses 
towards substances of abuse and how these individuals might be best handled by the law. There are 
likely similar cases of impulsive action where the individual and society would get the most benefit 
from a similar rehabilitative approach but where the behavioural evidence isn't strong enough to 
warrant the same type of sentencing. If the case can be strengthened by neurological evidence then the 
impulse-prone population can be better understood and treated appropriately. 
 Once procedures sensitive to indicators of addiction have been developed for use on the 
individual, the possibility exists of coming to conclusions about overall group behaviour, which in turn 
could help craft sentencing policy. The study group would ideally be a group of similar offenders 
committing similar offences over time. If similar offenders react in a similarly non-rational way in like 
situations then we can begin describing them as a group or cohort. If the population that commits a type 
of crime, for example, drug possession, is made up of a number of different groups then information 
about how much of that population is made up by a particular group, and also how effectively that 
group can be deterred by punishment, should be relevant to our deliberations about general deterrence. 
 
Section 718, Subsection (d): 
 This subsection of the Criminal Code states that one objective in sentencing is “to assist in 
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rehabilitating offenders”. I alluded in the above deterrence section to how neuroscience could be useful 
in rehabilitation. If rehabilitation is one of the major objectives in a case, as it often is in drug 
possession cases, then once an appropriate experimental scanning procedure has been designed one 
could gain some insight into how effective a given rehabilitative effort might be in allowing the 
offender to control their impulses. 
 A technique that is currently used by some private rehabilitative services is to take what is 
essentially an EEG snapshot of the subject’s brain and compare it to a large database of similar 
snapshots. Records are kept as to what rehabilitative efforts were most effective on each individual. If 
similarities are noticed between the snapshot of the new patient and other patients for whom a 
particular rehabilitative effort was effective, then the same approach can be applied to the new subject 
(See: Addiction Alternatives). A similar approach would not be hard to adapt to a certain percentage of 
accused individuals who demonstrate impulsive tendencies and who have indicators revealed through 
neuroimaging. 
 
Section 718, subsection (f): 
 This subsection states that one objective is “to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, 
and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims and to the community.” If we become clearer about 
the level to which someone was really “responsible” for their actions we can improve the ability to 
promote a sense of responsibility in that person. In other words, the imperative to “promote 
responsibility” means that the offender must acknowledge their causal role in the crime. If we can be 
clearer about what impulsive tendencies were active during the crime (or during a sufficiently similar 
experimental situation) we can be more precise when attempting to instill a sense of responsibility. 
 What's more, if we can use the methods above to identify the best possible rehabilitative 
methods for that individual, then by applying the most effective rehabilitation we can give that 
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individual greater cognitive control over their previously unconscious impulsive behaviours. Promoting 
responsibility can be accomplished in this way by giving the offender the responsibility, or at least, 
opportunity, to overcome their subconscious and impulsive drives. 
 
Section 718.1: 
 Section 718.1 is under the auspicious heading of Fundamental Principle and states “A sentence 
must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.” 
While judges give little specific reference to this section it is important nonetheless. If our fundamental 
principle of sentencing is that the sentence should be “proportionate” to the gravity of the offence and 
the “responsibility” of the defendant, then any evidence which suggests they are not as responsible in 
the relevant sense would be important. If one can show that an offender was acting impulsively then, 
depending on the gravity of the crime, it may call for a reduced sentence.  
 This would be akin to a diminished responsibility defense but applied during a sentencing trial. 
A similar type of reasoning already exists in Canadian sentencing trials that allow a judge to give 
different punishments to people convicted of the same crime. For example, if one person was a largely 
unwilling lookout for a car theft they could be convicted of the full offence without incurring the same 
sentence because they were less responsible for the actual crime than the car thief. 
 
 
Section 718.2, subsection (a), clause (iii.1): 
 This section deals with the idea that if there is evidence to suggest that the victim of the crime 
suffered a significant negative impact from the crime then the sentence can be aggravated. If we used 
behavioural tests combined with functional scanning to show that after the offence the victim was 
significantly more impulsive in a way that negatively affected their life then such evidence might be 
useful. For example a victim might be unable to control the impulse to get out of any room with 
someone who looks like the offender. Sexual assault which leads to an inability to cope with any type 
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of sexual attention could be a good target for such an approach. This section is particularly interesting 
because it relies for its justification in the consequence of the illegal action and not in the volition of the 
offender.  
 
Section 718, Subsection (b): 
 This subsection indicates that “a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar 
offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances”. The most important word here is 
“similar”. How we model what makes one offender similar to another is a matter of law which can 
draw from neuroscience. What characteristics are deemed relevant for comparison will depend on the 
type of case being presided over, but if structural and functional scans can show that two individuals 
who differ in some ways may be similarly susceptible to impulsive acts, then the punishments can be 
equalized accordingly. 
 
Section 718.2, subsection (d): 
  This subsection enshrines liberty as a fundamentally important idea and reads: “an offender 
should not be deprived of liberty, if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances”. 
These “less restrictive sanctions” may be any of a number of approaches. However, which approach 
would be most effective for a particular offender could be made clearer by information about their 
impulsive tendencies. 
 For example, the impulse to have sex is powerful and can be overpowering. If someone has an 
attraction to children then there is a significant issue. There are several ways of dealing with offenses 
like this. The first is to incarcerate indefinitely either in a prison or a psychiatric institution. This 
punishment is, on its face, the safest approach, but also the one which most restricts liberty. A more 
nuanced view is to limit where these individuals can live and work. While this is less limiting such a 
sentence would both limit spatial liberty, like incarceration, as well as limiting freedom through public 
stigma. 
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 Another approach could be to study the neurotechnological correlates of arousal in an individual 
and to fit them with a device to detect these correlates, similar to how an ankle bracelet relays 
information about a person’s location. This device could be connected to a camera or a GPS locator 
which would activate upon detection of these signals. It is unknown whether such a technique would 
work, or how practical it would be even if it did, but it presents an area worthy of exploration. 
 I pause here a moment to underline the potential darkness of such a scheme. While an impulse 
detecting ankle bracelet could, for certain individuals, maximize freedom, if it was applied too broadly 
as a mechanism of social control the effect could be dystopian. This example represents an excellent 
exposition of how, when adapting neurotechnologies to the realm of social control, the consequences of 
over reliance could in effect reduce social liberty and disrespect individual human dignity. 
 
Section Conclusion: 
 Sentencing presents a particularly exciting arena for neuroscience because of its flexibility. 
Judges have the power to individualize sentences based on the needs of the offender and the needs of 
society. Neuroscience can help us in being more accurate with the language of responsibility we use, to 
better tailor sentences to individuals, and can provide objective evidence for the punitive measures we 
employ. It can also help to indicate whether the offender should be directed towards alternative 
sentencing by providing objective measures which speak to the criteria surrounding drug abuse or 
mental disorder. 
 
Chapter Conclusion: 
 This chapter explored how neuroscience can be used to create better laws, can allow for more 
objective and accurate trials, and can be used to tailor sentencing to the needs of the individual. None 
of these efforts require neuroscience to discover complex neural mechanisms or to disprove 
responsibility. All that is required is taking the established resources provided by neurotechnologies, 
with slight modifications, and applying them in a concept-specific manner. 
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 The next chapter explores the ethical components of such an effort. It is common wisdom that 
just because something can be done doesn't mean it should be done. The field of applied ethics has 
developed in part to consider the possible ramifications of a technology before it reaches reality, in the 
hope of better preparing us for unwanted outcomes. In the next chapter I will undertake such an 
analysis of the techniques and ideas discussed in the previous chapters. 
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Chapter 4: Ethics of Using Neuroscience for Impulse Related Laws 
 
“And not only ought this regulation to be in harmony with morality--for obviously, people ought 
not to be compelled to do what they ought not to do--but further, to an 
important extent the Law of a man’s state will properly determine the 
details of his moral duty, even beyond the sphere of legal enforcement.” 
 
       -Henry Sedgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 1907 
 
Introduction: 
 So far we have explored the legal, scientific, and some of the philosophical, dimensions of 
neurolaw related to impulse control. To reconstruct, first we explored some of the important 
philosophical underpinnings of both the law and neuroscience. Doing so revealed how the law creates 
models that guide behaviour and uses evidence to prove that a person’s behaviour, at the time of the 
crime, fits into that model. We also began figuring out how one could adapt the techniques of 
neuroscience to provide evidence by conducting carefully designed experiments. I argued that 
neuroscientific techniques could be applied to laws relating to controlled substances, the irresistible 
impulse defense, and diminished responsibility defenses.  
 It is now time to consider the ethical ramifications of such an effort. I will discuss how the 
neuroscientific techniques introduced in Chapters 1 through 3 will affect the law and society, including 
individuals and groups. Ethics is a complex field. There are numerous ethics lenses which can draw 
different conclusions about the utility of a scientific discovery. My analysis is one such lens. I 
investigate how neuroscience can make the Canadian pursuit of justice both more therapeutic as well as 
more accurate in its characterization of individual responsibility. I argue that the tools and techniques of 
neuroscience can be useful to the law and that the ultimate reason for implementing them in a legal 
context is in their ability to maximize the therapeutic outcomes and autonomy of all those involved in 
the judicial process. 
 Contained within these two key aspects of my analysis (therapy and freedom) are important 
concepts from the field of bioethics. Therapeutic maximization comes from the field of therapeutic 
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jurisprudence (to be discussed more below). The field emerged from concerns about how mental illness 
and the law interact. Significant work has been done by psychiatrists and therapists to bring theories 
behind the treatment of those with mental illness, which include considerations of beneficence, non-
malfeasance, justice, and autonomy. (Pickard, 2013; Beauchamp and Childress, 2001). Legal writers 
have worked to adapt these theories, often under the title of restorative justice, to fields throughout the 
law, most predominantly the criminal law. (Pickard and Lacey, 2013) 
 Concerns about responsibility abound within the criminal law and take a central place in my 
analysis in this chapter. As mentioned in the preceding paragraph one of the major concerns in 
bioethics, and in ethics generally, has to do with autonomy - that is the ability someone has to freely 
make a choice which furthers their conception of their own good or interests. We have already briefly 
discussed in Chapter 3 how neuroscience can not only help to show when someone is not responsible, 
but to what extent they are responsible and how to build off those capacities. In doing so we gain a 
greater clarity into how autonomous an individual is given a certain context. In doing so, and especially 
when doing so to further therapeutic goals, we are taking a stance which attempts to maximize the 
autonomy of the subjects and to respect those decision making capacities which are intact. 
 The following material is organized into broad questions related to each of the neuroscience 
applications discussed in Chapter 3. The first section relates to the use of neuroscience when creating 
drug laws. The second section deals with the irresistible impulse defense. The third deals with 
diminished responsibility. Within each section I first take stock of the legal status quo and make note of 
its shortcomings. I then briefly explain how the appropriate use of neurotechnologies can aid the status 
quo. Once the above is clear, I examine the ethical justification for using neurotechnologies in these 
ways. I attempt to provide answers to, inter alia, the following questions: Who would be affected by 
the deployment of forensic neuroscience techniques? Would the effects of their use be maximally 
therapeutic? What technologies would be most effective given the legal concepts they aim to aid? After 
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considering all of these issues I make recommendations about both the development and deployment of 
neurotechnologies to the particular end in question. 
 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence: 
 Before delving in the specifics I would like to provide a brief explanation of the primary ethical 
theory which I will be applying: Therapeutic Jurisprudence. Jurisprudence is the study of where law 
draws its power and what are the legitimate uses of that power. It may sound strange initially that this 
has to do with ethics, but a brief illustration should make the connection clear. No matter where one 
vests the power of the law eventually it must be grounded in some conception of the good. If one is a 
natural law theorist one believes that law is imminent in nature and it is good to follow it because the 
universe has decreed these laws to be how reality should function. One may also vest the power of the 
law in a deity, such that following the law and, for example, being a good Christian, are one and the 
same. I do not place myself in either of those camps but instead argue, or rather therapeutic 
jurisprudence argues, that the power of the law comes from its ability to make the lives of those that 
come under its auspices better, more fulfilling, more filled with free choice, filled with less pain, and 
generally promoting the good of the subject. Notice how this grounding corresponds to the principles of 
bioethics discussed earlier (which themselves draw from utilitarian, deontological, and virtue theories 
of ethics). Thus the ideals of bioethics and therapeutic jurisprudence accord with one another. Indeed 
they both developed out of the same areas of concern surrounding how we should treat people in a 
medical and psychiatric context. 
 Therapeutic Jurisprudence is a particularly pertinent approach when investigating the criminal 
law. In the criminal law we are considering how (and whether) the accused has wronged another 
person, and how the accused has harmed society as a whole by infringing upon the reasonable 
expectation of the rule of law. During such a procedure we want to accomplish several things: to make 
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sure the person takes on the responsibility they deserve, to compensate the specific individuals harmed, 
and to take measures to ensure the accused does not do the same things again.  
 Inherent in all of these goals is the desire to heal: to heal the accused, those affected, and society 
as a whole. The old approach would be to use punishment as a means of healing or gaining peace of 
mind by appeasing a retributivist desire and deterring future acts. However such an approach is at the 
very least incomplete. There can be many causes of behaviour that are not under the control of the 
accused and thus for which they cannot meaningfully be held responsible. Some such offenders can, 
however, be healed and helped to change their behaviour and to benefit society. It is similar to a case 
where someone steps on another's foot because of a balance control issue. It makes little sense to hold 
the one with balance problems fully responsible for treading on the other. It makes total sense, 
however, to try and heal that person’s balance problem so that it doesn't happen again. 
 The reasoning above is particularly pertinent when neuroscience (or whatever science) indicates 
that the behaviour can be better characterized as caused by a disease or disorder than as a voluntary 
action. This line between criminal and disease behaviour is constantly being negotiated and represents 
different arms of the same project to improve our lives (Conrod and Schneider, 1992). When 
behaviours are considered disorder- or disease-caused, as is the case with irresistible impulse and 
diminished responsibility, therapeutic considerations should begin to take precedence over other goals 
of the law. 
 It is further the case that a therapeutic approach is the one most likely to bring about a change in 
the internal patterns which generate behaviour. This effort to change internal patterns is essentially the 
fundamental aim of any form of therapy. A good therapeutic approach will attempt to identify the root 
of the problem, establish trust, find reasonable goals for change, and apply the best tools available to 
the end of achieving those goals. 
Section 1 - Should We Create Drug Laws Which Rely Centrally on Neuroscientific evidence?: 
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Subsection 1 – The Status Quo: 
 The current status quo of controlled substance laws in Canada is an amalgamation of historical 
trends in drug enforcement, social pressures, and quasi-scientific reasoning (Erickson, 1992). Before 
drug prohibition substances which are currently illegal could be found in many household products. 
Cocaine and Heroin were both first synthesized in Europe in the 1800's and could be found in food 
products (the wine Vin Mariani and the original Coca Cola) and countless patent medications (opiates 
work as highly effective antitussives, analgesics, and antidiarrheals). Over the next century and a half 
Canada and the rest of the world began to recognize the possible danger of these and similar 
substances. These dangers, combined with cultural trends and ideologies, led to the scheduling system 
Canada now employs (Pietschmann, 2006). 
 Substances are organized into schedules based on several considerations including: Overall risk 
to public health and safety posed by the substance; Chemical and pharmacological similarity to other 
substances already regulated under the CDSA; Legitimate uses of the substance;  Potential for abuse 
and risk of addiction associated with the substance; Extent of actual abuse of the substance in Canada 
and internationally; and International requirements and trends in international control {See: Order 
Amending Schedule I to the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (MDPV)}. The Governor-in-
Council, with advisement from the Ministry of Health, can then use arguments based on one or more of 
these considerations to place a substance in one of the Schedules; a vote from parliament is not needed 
for such an amendment to be made. A range of punishments are then attached to possession, trafficking, 
or production offences (See: CDSA s4-s7). 
 The different levels of responsibility which I suggest can be highlighted by neuroscience have 
already begun having an effect on the law, though only indirectly through sentencing. In many 
Canadian jurisdictions there are courts specifically designed to handle those charged with drug offences 
where there is evidence that the offence was motivated by an addiction (See: Drug Treatment Courts, 
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2007). If the trial judge is satisfied that an accused individual qualifies for treatment, a guilty plea is 
entered and they proceed through a multi-step assessment and treatment procedure. 
 
Subsection 2 – Issues With the Status Quo: 
 There is important and ethically relevant commentary from many fields which has heavily 
criticized the project of prohibition (See: Report of the Global Commission on Drug Policy). While 
these arguments are certainly worth considering given the massive toll prohibition has taken on our 
society, I must stick to those critiques based on the discoveries of, and potential uses of, neuroscience. 
What neuroscience offers is the kind of increased resolution discussed in Chapter 3, so the question 
becomes: What harms or injustices are produced under the current justice system that are unnecessary 
given what neuroscience can tell us? 
  A naive approach would be to hold neuroscientific factors as the single most important criteria 
for scheduling. Such an approach would make scheduling much easier, but would fail to recognize the 
multi-modal project that the law must take on. Instead, neuroscience urges us to use its results to 
deliver justice with greater accuracy. This greater accuracy would be achieved by being able to tell with 
greater certainty both exactly how addictive a substance is as well as the neural and behavioural 
characteristics of the accused which indicate diminished responsibility. Our drug scheduling laws and 
sentencing guidelines could then be adapted with the help of neuroscience.  
 
 
Subsection 3 – How Neuroscience Should Help: 
 When the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and the Sentencing portion of the Canadian 
Criminal Code are considered in conjunction, Canada has a reasonable approach to drug enforcement 
given our current justifications. Furthermore, if one looks at the actual practices of sentencing and the 
use of specialized drug and mental health courts, those with serious impulse issues are often dealt with 
in a sensible manner since they are directed towards treatment programs instead of sent to prison. There 
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are, however, two ways in which neuroscience can help us to create better laws. Neuroscience can give 
us the best possible evidence for precisely how addictive and dangerous a substance is, and it can help 
to create further distinctions within the law concerning offenders with fundamentally different levels of 
responsibility. Both are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
 
 
Using Neuroscience to Re-categorize Substances: 
 There are two separate and yet compatible ways in which neuroscience can help us change how 
substances are classified within the law. The first way is by providing further evidence for current 
justifications. Two of the most important considerations when a drug is scheduled are its level of 
addictiveness (the words reward and pleasure are often used interchangeably with addictiveness) and 
its short and long term health harms to the user. Both of these either have been or can be assessed using 
standard neuroscience techniques. Getting clearer on these justifications does the secondary duty of 
causing us to examine the concurrent justifications behind how a particular substance is scheduled. 
 Neuroscience evidence could prompt a re-examination of why certain substances are scheduled 
as they are and a discussion about whether the current justifications hold muster. As an example, I will 
discuss two classes of substances which are currently classified in ways not clearly compatible with 
neuroscientific reasoning: the Cannabinoids and the Psychadelics. 
 Cannabinoids make up the entirety of Schedule II, the one that carries the second harshest 
penalties (though it must be mentioned that Schedule II punishments are reserved for those possessing 
amounts most likely for trafficking). There is evidence, both behavioural and neuroscientific, to suggest 
that certain Cannabinoids (including the famous Teterahydrocannabionol or THC) stimulate the reward 
pathway (Lupica et al. 2004). The extent to which this stimulation occurs, however, is significantly 
smaller than other illegal substances (such as cocaine and heroin), or of many legal substances (such as 
nicotine, alcohol, and some over the counter medications) (Gable, 2004; van Amsterdam et al., 2010). 
62 
 
 There is also little to no evidence of long term or short term dangerousness or neural 
degeneration posed by Cannabinoids. There has never been a verified case of Cannabis overdose. The 
LD50 (the dose at which 50% of people would die of overdose) is astronomical. There is of course the 
risk of adverse effects on the lungs, though this is true of any substance that is burned and then inhaled 
and could be largely if not completely eliminated by vaporizing or ingestion through doped foods. The 
evidence of long term structural as well as functional damage or impairment is debatable (Lorenzetti et 
al., 2010), with some studies suggesting that even chronic Cannabis users (those who have smoked at 
least 5000 joints worth) have no detectable cognitive deficits compared to the normal public after a 
month of cessation (Pope et al. 2001). There is evidence to suggest that Cannabis consumption can 
aggravate underlying psychiatric disorders such as anxiety and depression (Patton et al., 2002), but the 
cause and effect relationship in these cases is uncertain. Furthermore, Cannabadiol is a naturally 
occurring Cannabinoid, and is categorized as a Schedule II substance because of its similarity to other 
Cannabinoids. However, there is evidence concerning this substance suggesting that it is either 
minimally or completely non-addictive and it has been heralded as a potentially highly effective anti-
psychotic and epilepsy medication (Devinsky et al. 2014). 
 Almost exactly the same analysis applies to the psychedelics (LSD, Psylosibin, and Mescalin), 
and makes us seriously question why they are currently Schedule III substances. There is little to no 
evidence of these substances presenting a significant addiction risk, with their rapid tolerance effects 
making continuous binging  difficult (Shulgin, 1980). Psychedelics are certainly less addictive then 
some of the other substances found in Schedule 3, such as Methylphenidate (the major component in 
the medication Ritalin) (Parran and Jasinski, 1991).  
 The evidence of any short or long term brain damage resulting from the use of psychedelics is 
inconclusive mainly because no significant research has been conducted on the topic. There is 
significant anecdotal evidence of underlying psychiatric disorders being exacerbated by psychedelics, 
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however, there is a growing set to match it which suggests that controlled psychedelic experiences 
could provide effective treatment for certain disorders (such as depression) (Gasser et al., 2014). Once 
again insufficient research prevents one from forming definite conclusions. 
 The above evidence encourages two paths forward. The first is to continue research on these 
substances to become clear on their real dangers in terms of brain damage, exacerbation of psychiatric 
disorders, and addictive potential. Such research could be pursued through cell culture experiments, 
animal model based experiments, and functional and structural experiments on humans. 
 Some good research has been conducted and leads us to the second path: re-examination of how 
and why these substances are currently scheduled the way they are in light of what we know. As 
mentioned earlier, the test for whether a substance should be scheduled, and what schedule it should 
fall under, is a multi-pronged approach which takes into account social as well as medical harms. Given 
that Cannabis and the Psychedelics present little risk of significant harm, or of significant addictive 
potential, for the majority of people, maintaining those substances within their current schedule would 
rely on there being significant social harms coming from their use. While I cannot examine those 
justifications in detail, I can say a few things with some certainty. 
 First of all, no matter its current legal status, Cannabis is commonly consumed in Canada and 
all evidence suggests that its social consequences, both in terms of adverse effects on society and in 
terms of increased cost to our healthcare system, if not non-existent, are significantly lower than those 
for either Tobacco or Alcohol. Both Tobacco and Alcohol present more of an addictive risk as well as 
causing greater damage to the body and brain (van Amsterdam et al., 2010). 
 We cannot draw as clear a conclusion about the Psychedelics as they are simply not as 
commonly consumed or documented as Cannabis, but beyond some widely publicized hospitalizations 
it does not appear that our society is better for banning them or would be harmed by legalizing or at 
least rescheduling them. Reasoning from the starting premises that unless there is significant evidence 
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of harm a substance or act should not be prohibited (this is the maximization of liberty), and that 
prohibition often leads to an increased black markets and all of their associated harms, then prohibiting 
Psychedelics may well be causing significantly more harm than good. Furthermore making these 
substance illegal means that education is often limited and thus the people partaking in them are 
uninformed about how they can cause an adverse reaction and will avoid seeking help and medical 
attention of these adverse reactions occur for fear of legal repercussions. 
 I mentioned earlier that there were two compatible paths to the reclassification of drugs. The 
first we have just discussed and involves either re-scheduling of substances based on what is known, or 
a pro-active effort by neuroscience to find evidence for why certain substances are classified as they are 
given their dangerousness or addictive potential. The other path is to create another classification 
system based entirely on addictiveness to be used when someone is charged with possession or 
trafficking in small amounts. A method similar to this has been researched in the United Kingdom (Nutt 
et al., 2007). Such a document would act as a useful guide for judges when deciding whether to direct a 
person either towards treatment or towards prison. If there is evidence of addiction or addictive 
tendencies and the person is accused of possession a small amount of a particularly addictive drug then 
these pieces of evidence can combine and urge the judge to attempt the treatment approach. On the 
other hand, if there is no evidence of addiction and the person is simply trafficking a highly addictive 
substance then the other scheduling system would be consulted and their charge could be aggravated as 
they pose a higher risk to the public than those who traffic in only minimally addictive substances. 
 
 
Using Neuroscience to Nuance Possession Charges: 
 The other way neuroscience can help change our drug laws is by helping to create a greater set 
of distinctions between possession by an addicted individual, possession by a person with an impulse 
control disorder, possession by a casual user, and possession for the sake of trafficking, producing, 
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importing, or exporting. Currently the legislation only makes the distinction between possession and 
possession for the sake of trafficking, producing, or importing and exporting. These distinctions are 
good because they recognize that there is a different level of wrongfulness between simple possession 
and the other offences. Such a simple distinction, however, implies that the law recognizes an equal 
level of responsibility for individuals in each of these groups. An ideal law, however, would attempt to 
recognize at the earliest possible moment exactly how responsible, that is, how rational and non-
impulsive, a person is for an act. 
 As we saw in Chapter 3 there is good reason to doubt that someone acting on an addictive 
impulse is truly fully responsible for their actions. People acting on an addictive impulse also do not 
usually exercise the kind of long term rational thinking and conscious deliberation present in those who 
produce, import, or export a substance. If the law hopes to faithfully recognize true responsibility in its 
categorizations of crime, which is an important aim in the creation of our laws, something must change. 
 This change can happen in one of two ways. The first would be to enshrine a diminished 
responsibility defense in law, and allow it to be applied to cases where there is evidence of diminished 
responsibility due to mitigated impulse control. Such evidence would include evidence from 
neuroscience. This path will be discussed further in the section on diminished responsibility below. The 
second way is to change the wording of our drug laws such that diminished responsibility is implicitly 
recognized. 
 Such an approach would lead to changes in the section of the CDSA related to possession 
offences for substances that have been found to have significantly addictive properties and where the 
person shows signs of being addicted. Currently the law (that is Section 4 of the CDSA) indicates that 
all possession, or seeking to gain possession, of a given substance is equally blameworthy. Only once 
the accused has pleaded guilty and taken full responsibility are they directed towards alternative 
treatments. 
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 The law could be changed, however, to include elements related to addiction and limited 
impulse control. For example the charge of possession reads as follows: 
 
Possession of substance 
 
 4.(1)Except as authorized under the regulations, no person shall possess a substance included in 
Schedule I, II or III. 
Obtaining substance 
(2)No person shall seek or obtain 
 (a)a substance included in Schedule I, II, III or IV, or 
 (b)an authorization to obtain a substance included in Schedule I, II, III or IV 
from a practitioner, unless the person discloses to the practitioner particulars relating to the 
acquisition by the person of every substance in those Schedules, and of every authorization to 
obtain such substances, from any other practitioner within the preceding thirty days. 
Punishment 
(3) Every person who contravenes subsection (1) where the subject-matter of the offence is a 
substance included in Schedule I 
 (a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
seven years; or 
 (b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction and liable 
 (I) for a first offence, to a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars or to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, or to both, and 
 (ii) for a subsequent offence, to a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars or to 
imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year, or to both. 
... 
 
 To this formulation could easily be added a clause which works similarly to that of provocation 
in s. 232 of the Criminal Code. If there is evidence that the individual has an addiction and has 
difficulty controlling impulses towards substances of abuse, the clause would take effect. For example, 
the “punishment” clauses could state that a person, 
 
 Is guilty of a mitigated form of the offence called “possession under the influence 
of powerful impulse” if 
 (i) there is evidence that the accused suffers from a disorder which 
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interferes with the ability to control impulses, and/or 
 (ii) there is evidence that the individual's actions are substantially 
motivated by addictive impulses. 
 [Therefore the person] is liable, on the first offence, to mental health and 
addictions assessment and treatment for such, and 
 for a subsequent offence to assessment, treatment, and further measures 
possibly including: confinement in a treatment facility, probation 
restrictions, or whatever measures are just and necessary to pursue 
effective changes in behaviour. 
 
 Adding such a clause and sub-clauses (those above I have written myself) would do the dual 
duty of recognizing as early as possible in the judicial process a more accurate characterization of 
individual responsibility, as well as directing people into appropriate treatment paths. It would also 
make it clear that while the law maintains that the activity is illegal it recognizes the significant public 
health component. The proof that an accused has either of the characteristics outlined in (i) and (ii) 
could be provided by his or her previous criminal record, and by the psychiatric and neuroscientific 
methods discussed in previous chapters. 
 
 
Subsection 4 - Ethics Analysis: 
 A fair amount of ethics analysis has been performed in the previous two subsections. Therein I 
discussed the harms related to inappropriate scheduling. Furthermore I discussed how it is inherently 
unjust for a legal system to ascribe full responsibility to a person where there is evidence to suggest that 
their rational responsibility is reduced in some significant fashion either by mental disorder or by 
addiction. 
 I would like to briefly discuss here some further ethically relevant effects the changes above 
would have. For much of this discussion I will use the lens of therapeutic jurisprudence. This approach 
to the law was born out of mental health law. It finds laws most justified when they are maximally 
therapeutic for all parties (Goldberg, 2011). As such this perspective concentrates on the people 
affected by judicial paradigms. 
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 The most obviously affected individual is the accused themselves. All of the changes mentioned 
above attempt to reflect the actual responsibility of the accused, and to direct the accused towards the 
treatment that will be maximally therapeutic. A change in the wording of the law, as suggested in the 
previous subsection, would inherently recognize the need for treatment and the need to accurately 
portray the responsibility (or lack thereof) of the accused. Such a change would also remove some of 
the retributive language within the current law. 
 Such a recognition places the justice system in a specifically therapeutic position with respect to 
addicts and those with impulse control disorders. Instead of an adversarial system worked out to punish 
these people, the legal system can be used to protect and treat those with addictions issues, while also 
taking a prohibitory stance. This repositioning is likely by itself to have a therapeutic effect on the 
relationship between the justice system and this vulnerable population. 
 This more nuanced approach could be further therapeutic to the family of the accused and their 
local community as a whole. Families and close relations could be confident that interactions with the 
justice system will be motivated by treatment and compassion as opposed to imprisonment and 
retribution. For communities, further therapeutic effects can be imagined. Addictions treatment is a 
more effective means of reducing addiction than imprisonment (Gossop et al., 2005). A society with 
fewer addicts is a happier and healthier one. 
 
Section Conclusion: 
 The suggestions made above would move the law towards a more ethically justifiable position. 
Neuroscience has either already provided evidence for why these changes should be made, or has 
offered us an opportunity to explore whether our current justifications meet ethical muster. I have 
argued for the following options as changes to the law: (1) We should reschedule those substances 
where doing so is indicated, (2) We should create a new legally recognized document which orders 
substances based on neural dangerousness and addictive potential, (3) We should change the law itself 
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such that diminished levels of responsibility are inherently recognized. These changes would ensure 
that our justice system is as just as possible and would increase the therapeutic value of these laws for 
every party involved. 
 
Section 2: Should We Create an Irresistible Impulse Defense?: 
 
Subsection 1 - The Status Quo of Irresistible Impulse: 
 An ideal mental disorder defense would allow for any person who is morally innocent by reason 
of irregular neural activity to avail of it. Such innocence can be realized in several different ways. One 
example is if the person was suffering from some delusion which prevented them from appreciating or 
knowing what they were doing or what the consequence of their actions would be. For example, if 
someone suffering from a psychotic episode truly believed that a neighbor's garbage can was a monster 
from hell, and thus destroyed the can, they would in no reasonable sense have understood or 
appreciated the nature or quality of the act or its consequences. In cases such as this the current mental 
disorder defense (s. 16) is applicable and justly employed. 
 There is another set of cases, however, that an ideal mental disorder defense would recognize as 
innocent. These are the disorders of impulse we have been discussing so far. For example, if someone 
found themselves compelled, beyond their power to consciously resist, to destroy the garbage can, it 
would seem that such a person would also be innocent of an offense. There are many examples of 
individuals with mental irregularities who feel compelled beyond their control to perform an action. 
These people can be well aware of the nature of the act and yet none the less be helpless to resist. 
However, the current mental disorder defense does not apply to irresistible impulse (as opposed to lack 
of awareness). 
 Furthermore, the current mental disorder defense, as illustrated by Penney, does not apply to 
those who suffer from fixations caused by mental irregularity that force them to make impossible 
choices between prohibited actions and acute suffering. (Penney, 2013) Nonetheless, criminal liability 
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should not attach to such actions. As an example, imagine someone suffering from a persistent and 
nagging belief that their neighbour's garbage can was going to have a bomb planted inside of it. After 
waking up in the middle of the night in a cold and shaking sweat, the person destroys the garbage can. 
Since the person suffers from such distress, not acting was not really an option. Therefore the act was 
not meaningfully voluntary which means that the person is morally innocent. In this scenario the person 
may know full well that there are potential legal and moral consequences to their actions. So the current 
mental disorder defense would not apply. Yet the person should escape criminal liability. 
 Currently, courts use case histories, accounts of long time relations, and forensic psychiatric 
evaluation as evidence in making decisions about the applicability of the mental disorder defense 
(Roach, 2011). 
 
 
Subsection 2 - Issues With the Status Quo: 
 The major reason an impulse-based branch of the mental disorder defense has not been 
legitimized in Canada is a perceived inability to reliably detect the irregularities that give rise to them. 
The legal scholar Stephen Penney has nicely laid out the status quo of the irresistible impulse defense 
in Canada and the issues with its current application, or lack thereof. 
 In his most comprehensive paper on the subject (Penney, 2013), Penney describes the current 
jurisprudence around irresistible impulse. He first establishes the idea that an action caused by 
uncontrollable impulse cannot reasonably be considered morally voluntary. He then demonstrates 
through examination of several important cases (i.e., R. v Ruzic, R. v Creighton) how the Supreme 
Court of Canada has established voluntariness as a fundamental principle of justice covered under 
section 7 of the Charter. 
  Through his argument Penney establishes a perspective on the legal status quo that leaves room 
for an irresistible impulse branch of the mental disorder defense. He then goes on to discuss the 
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neuroscientific evidence which suggests that those with impulse control issues have different 
neuroanatomy and function than control subjects or those with disorders of rational functions. 
As a final step Penney investigates the use of the defense in other jurisdictions that currently 
allow it. One of the major worries attached to the irresistible impulse defense is that it will allow people 
to fake the symptoms and thereby avoid a guilty plea. Penney goes through several jurisdictions that 
have had their use of the defense cataloged and demonstrates that a finding of Not Criminally 
Responsible (NCR) based on impulse alone is rare and almost always co-occurs with an established 
psychiatric diagnosis. He further demonstrates that psychological tests for impulse control exist, are 
used in a professional psychiatric environment, and are not fundamentally less effective than tests used 
to demonstrate the rational and cognitive capacities the law currently excuses. The implication is that 
the fear of mental malingering in these jurisdictions seems to be, as of yet, unfounded. 
 According to Penney, the irresistible impulse defense should only be extended to those who 
found the act or omission completely irresistible. This sets the limits of the argument on more 
established and indisputable grounds, rather than arguing for intermediate levels of impulse control and 
their moral and legal ramifications. He admits that such a bright line might seem strange to 
neuroscientists but is required when working with a legal system like ours. 
 Out of Penney's analysis we can draw several important issues that deserve ethical 
consideration. First, we can be relatively certain that, based on the neuroscientific and psychological 
evidence, there does exist a population that has neural irregularities which make impulse control 
difficult or impossible but which don't demonstrate the deficits in rational capacities required by the 
current interpretation of the mental disorder defense in s. 16 of the Criminal Code. Second, other 
jurisdictions which have recognized the irresistible impulse defense seem to be able to detect 
individuals from this population without an undue amount of error. 
 I will argue below that by not recognizing irresistible impulse as a defense, our legal system is 
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causally implicated in harms which could be ameliorated. Our legal system is taking a punitive 
approach where a therapeutic one is warranted. Prison, and the adversarial trial which precedes 
incarceration, cause more harm than they must. First, however, I would like to briefly discuss exactly 
how neuroscience is urging us to change the law. There are several different scenarios and each has its 
own unique content and context that will bear on the ethics discussion to follow. 
 
 
Subsection 3 - Changing the Law: 
 If we want to change how the law interacts with people who have impulse control issues, there 
are two paths: amending the legislation itself, or allowing a common law defense of irresistible 
impulse. It is not at first obvious how neuroscience bears on either of these options beyond indicating 
that one of them should be taken. A deeper investigation reveals that there are some important points to 
consider from a neuroscientific perspective. 
 The first possibility (which Penney suggests) is to allow a broader interpretation of the mental 
disorder defense such that it encompasses those who may suffer from an irresistible impulse leading to 
criminal behavior. The advantage of such a scheme is that it would not require an act of parliament for 
implementation. Most likely a new interpretation of Section 16 would be accepted by a trial judge 
somewhere and, after multiple appeals, make it to the Supreme Court of Canada. The justices would 
then have to determine whether new knowledge allows us to re-interpret the reading of the law. 
 Another approach would be to legislatively create another branch of the defense specific to 
irresistible impulses. If we were to amend the law it would most likely take the form of adding extra 
clauses to Section 16 of the Criminal Code that are sensitive to irresistible impulse. Several different 
versions have been enacted in different jurisdictions., however by and large the execution is similar, 
with the major difference being in the level of detail given to each branch. The majority of the 
jurisdictions in the United States which allow irresistible impulse use the test in the Model Penal Code, 
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which goes as follows: 
 
“a person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental 
disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.” 
 
 This version (West's Encyclopedia of American Law, 2005) is sensitive to the different types of 
mental disorder defense, however it doesn't use clause based format to define the branches as is the 
common format of Canadian laws. For that type of approach we could look at the Southern Australian 
formulation (Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 s269C). 
 
“A person is mentally incompetent to commit an offence if, at the time of the conduct  
alleged to give rise to the offence, the person is suffering from a mental impairment and, in 
consequence of the mental impairment 
  (a) does not know the nature and quality of the conduct; or 
 (b) does not know that the conduct is wrong; or 
(c) is unable to control the conduct” 
 
 This test is in a clause-based format, however, leaves significant area open for interpretation of 
sub-section (c). Unable to control conduct, if narrowly interpreted, could only cover actions caused by 
overwhelming compulsion and not by forced choice. For a more specific version yet we could turn to 
the Tasmanian legislation (See: Criminal Code Act 1924. s16). 
 
“(1) A person is not criminally responsible for an act done or an omission made by him –  
(a) when afflicted with mental disease to such an extent as to render him incapable of –  
(i) understanding the physical character of such act or omission; or  
   (ii) knowing that such act or omission was one which he ought not to do or make; 
or  
(b) when such act or omission was done or made under an impulse which, by reason of mental 
disease,he was in substance deprived of any power to resist. 
 
(2) The fact that a person was, at the time at which he is alleged to have done an act or made an 
omission, incapable of controlling his conduct generally, is relevant to the question whether he did such 
act or made such omission under an impulse which by reason of mental disease he was in substance 
deprived of any power to resist. 
 
 (3) A person whose mind at the time of his doing an act or making an omission is affected by a 
74 
 
delusion on some specific matter, but who is not otherwise exempted from criminal responsibility 
under the foregoing provisions of this section, is criminally responsible for the act or omission to the 
same extent as if the fact which he was induced by such delusion to believe to exist really existed.  
(4) For the purpose of this section the term mental disease includes natural imbecility.” 
 
 This version presents the best formulation in my estimation for several reasons. Sub-section (b) 
captures both those who were compelled by some internal force, or by an extremely difficult choice 
causing them to be “in substance deprived of any power to resist”. Section (2) also captures this feature 
in greater detail. This formulation mirrors that proposed by Morse as discussed in Chapter 3 (Morse, 
1994). 
 
Subsection 4 - Ethics Analysis: 
 Now that the two paths have been made clear let us discuss some of the ethics ramifications of 
the approaches. For the most part the results will be the same, however, once again there are some 
differences worth noting. 
 If we were to expand the current definition then the judiciary itself would have to take an active 
role in designing the defense, applying its standards of evidence, and affirming it through several 
different decisions. This activity would require a significant partnership between lawyers, judges, 
psychiatrists, and neuroscientists, and would present a united front of these parties in developing the 
defense. 
 One practical problem with this approach is that it relies on an unnatural interpretation of the 
word “appreciating”. Section 16 of the Criminal Code states that, 
 
No person is criminally responsible for an act committed or an omission made while suffering 
from a mental disorder that rendered the person incapable of appreciating the nature and quality 
of the act or omission or of knowing that it was wrong. 
 
If it comes to expanding the definition of “appreciating” to include delusions, psychosis, mood 
disorders, impulsive acts, and so on then “appreciating” runs the risk of meaning essentially anything. 
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The other issue is that this approach does not engage the representatives of the public through 
parliament, and as such is vulnerable to new reactionary laws limiting or eliminating the defense. 
 Beyond these considerations either path would lead to improved therapeutic outcomes for the 
population of people with impulse control problems who are in legal trouble. Instead of being put into a 
highly stressful prison environment they would instead be directed towards a psychiatric evaluation and 
treatment. Furthermore the position during the trial would turn from an assessment of guilty or not 
guilty to one of how to best treat this vulnerable individual. Psychiatric resources could then be 
employed throughout the trial, sentencing, and treatment with the best outcomes for the accused in 
mind the whole time. The judge and lawyers appear in this context as parties who are positioned to 
fight for what is best for the accused and society and not simply as those who dole out punishment. 
 Lastly, the family members of impulsive individuals are often the ones who take the brunt of the 
suffering, and who must advocate for the proper treatment of their loved one. The family members in 
these cases are left having to argue for the humanity and dignity of the patient. Psychiatric and legal 
institutions would likely be seen as the opposition rather than as members of the treatment team. If we 
can, by enshrining irresistible impulse in the law, prevent such an oppositional attitude we are aiding all 
parties. 
 
Critiques: 
 These last paragraphs deal with two critiques pertaining to the conclusions I have drawn above 
which must be discussed before this section is complete. The first is the possibility of continuous and 
extended detention in a psychiatric facility, and the second concerns what types of impulsive behaviour 
we as a society want to excuse. 
 For some people a psychiatric hospital will not be the most therapeutic environment. Especially 
for those with mood disorders or paranoia who may be able to realize better outcomes in a home 
environment with those they know and trust. However, once someone has committed a crime and avails 
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of the Section 16 it is the decision of the hospital and a review board, in consultation with various 
parties, if and when the person can be released. This consideration must take into account not just the 
patient but also the safety of the public, which might be most easily accomplished by keeping the 
patient at the facility. As such a patient may end up staying for far longer in what is ultimately a less 
than therapeutic environment than they would have had to with a standard prison sentence (depending 
on the crime of course), after which they could have returned home to an ultimately more therapeutic 
environment. This issue is a persistent one when it comes to involuntarily committing patients for 
whatever reason and has important implications when attempting to maximize both therapeutic 
outcomes as well as the liberty of the accused person. 
 The second concern is the possibility that enshrining an irresistible impulse defense could lead 
to excusing certain types of disorders which are dangerous to society. The impulse disorders within the 
DSM include Kleptomania, Pyromania, Pathological Gambling, and a number of other disorders which 
pose either a physical or financial risk to others within society. While legally excusing these behaviours 
may at first seem unpalatable we must consider a long term perspective. The only way of stopping 
these unwanted behaviours is to empower the affected individual to overcome these impulses. A prison 
environment will almost certainly not help people regain control over their impulses but, if the person 
does not have the means for private treatment, prison is often the only option. By allowing these 
populations to avail of a Section 16 defense they would be funneled towards treatment environments 
where the goals of rehabilitation and specific deterrence are much more likely to be successfully 
accomplished. 
 
Section 3 - Should We Create a Diminished Responsibility Defense?: 
 
Introduction: 
 In the last section we discussed the possibility of developing an irresistible impulse defense that 
would shield people who are fully morally innocent of a crime due to uncontrollable impulses. I argued 
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that this is a just and ethically commendable move which will produce significant therapeutic gains for 
the population it affects. There is a problem with this approach, however, if we take a strictly 
neuroscientific perspective. The issue is that while there are certainly those who are fully morally 
innocent due to their impulses, and there are those who are fully able to control impulses, there is a 
large and understudied swath of people who fit somewhere in the middle of this distribution. These 
people will have impulse control issues but only at certain times, in specific contexts, and after 
exposure to particular stimuli. 
 The issue is further complicated by the fact that there doesn't appear to be a single capacity for 
impulse control but that it is an effect of the balance between several different neural modules, each 
underlying some portion of the control over our actions. An ideal law would be able to recognize these 
differences, weigh them alongside specific and general deterrence concerns and studied effects, and 
come up with a law that is tailored to recognizing, analyzing, and changing the undesirable behaviour. I 
will argue in what follows that there are certain impulse deficits for which we already have sufficient 
information, others where more information could be gathered, and move on to discuss what 
appropriate legal recognition of this knowledge would look like. 
 
Subsection 1 - The Status Quo and Issues: 
 For the most part, at least at the trial phase, Canada does not recognize differing levels of 
responsibility based on the ability to control impulse. There are some exceptions to this trend. If you 
recall Chapter 3 we discussed the inherent recognition within Section 232 of the Criminal Code dealing 
with crimes of provocation. To summarize, this section allows the charge of murder to be reduced to 
manslaughter if the accused was sufficiently provoked so as to lose the ability to control himself or 
herself.  
 As a logical extension of this section I contend that there should be available a defense of 
diminished responsibility that reflects differing levels of impulse control. This defense would allow the 
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court to recognize at the trial phase different levels of responsibility and thus to recognize from the 
earliest possible moment the correct amount of liability to attach to the individual.  
 In much the same way as has been discussed in the previous two sections the diminished 
responsibility could either be developed by creating affirmative legislation or by allowing the defense 
at common law.  
 
Subsection 2 - What is Neuroscience Telling Us to Do?: 
 From a neuroscience perspective there are two complimentary paths forward if we accept that 
diminished responsibility is legitimate. The first is to develop the defense in areas where we have 
significant reason to question responsibility based on what we already know. Drug laws present the best 
example. We know, that is we have demonstrated through many neuroscientific and psychological 
studies, that addictive substances have significant effects on the brain and that, especially where 
addiction is powerful, people have a reduced ability to control their impulses to acquire and consume 
substances of abuse (Hyman, 2007; Brewer and Potenza, 2008; Fox et al., 2007; Fox et al., 2008). 
 The question then is, recalling the different options discussed above, how should we develop the 
law? In the case of addiction there is an obvious external cause of the impulsive actions, namely the 
substance of abuse. In a case like this, where the behaviour and the external factors are well known, we 
should change the law in the most specific way possible.  
 The best approach would be to only change the laws specific to drug possession as opposed to 
developing a more general defense. I demonstrated what such an approach might look like in Section 1 
of this chapter and doing so would be equivalent to creating a diminished responsibility defense which 
was only applicable to drug addiction cases for which we can be reasonably sure there is substance 
dependent interference with impulse control. 
 There should also be a general defense of diminished responsibility which could be applied to 
basically any law depending on what we know about the impulse control of the accused. If it could be 
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determined that for this particular individual the stimuli they encountered is one to which they are 
particularly sensitive, then the defense could allow the court to diminish the charges. Precisely the 
same machinery is currently in place to allow the provocation defense, where the judge can consider if 
insults to particular personal characteristics (race, sex, belief system) or based on some details about 
the accused’s biology (age) allow for a legitimate loss of control. Further legal-concept specific 
research may well be required before this version of the defense is rightly empowered.  
 
Subsection 3 – Ethics Analysis: 
 Many of the ethics arguments for establishing a diminished responsibility defense are in 
substance the same as those discussed for irresistible impulse. In summary: taking a more therapeutic 
approach leads to better outcomes for the accused, a more justifiable position for our society to take, 
and better outcomes for the family and local environment of the accused. There are, however, unique 
elements specific to the diminished responsibility defense.  
 The first is the therapeutic utility of maintaining that the individual is still, to some extent, 
responsible for their actions. By paying attention to the level of control someone has, and by finding 
that level experimentally, we can begin to develop therapies and strategies which capitalize on the 
control someone can exercise and to extend that capacity to other areas of their life through association 
and learning. 
 As a brief example and aside let us consider the different approaches to addiction currently 
used. For almost a century the 12 step AA program has been an effective method for some people to 
overcome their addictive tendencies. Part of this approach is the admission that one is totally powerless 
when it comes to alcohol (or whatever substance) and that total abstinence is the only way to exist (Bill 
W, 2012). More modern approaches (See: Addiction Alternatives and the work of Dr. Andrew Hill), 
however, are being developed which allow people to find, using both psychological and neuroscientific 
knowledge, the level of control they do actually have and to develop the ability to consume in 
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moderation. This approach allows people to have much more control over their lives as it avoids either 
the overwhelming presence or complete absence of a substance being a determinative part of their 
existence and happiness. The reason this approach works is that it recognizes that the person is both to 
some extent unable to control their actions, but to other extents are able to control them, and to use the 
best techniques we have to investigate and develop these natural capacities.  
 A diminished responsibility defense, by more naturally modeling human control mechanisms, 
would similarly allow for a more accurate picture of responsibility, as well as allowing for specific 
sentencing guidelines which, given that picture, would be most effective. Furthermore it would sustain 
some aspect of the deterrence effect by maintaining that, while the law is sensitive to impulse, it will 
still hold those responsible to the extent that their responsibility can be recognized or demonstrated. 
 
Critiques: 
 Some critiques bear on this section that should be discussed. The first is the claim that when it 
comes to actually measuring the level of responsibility we are unable to do so with sufficient accuracy. 
However, in some cases we can measure it, like measuring the lack of impulse control in irresistible 
impulse cases, while in others, such as drug addiction, we can be relatively sure that there is a 
significant interference with impulse control even if we cannot know that exact level in every situation. 
Further, in those cases where we cannot be so sure, we have the tools to develop tests which we can use 
to be more certain. If the judiciary were to take an active approach and use the techniques discussed in 
Chapter 3 then eventually we can begin to recognize the true level of responsibility inherent in any 
criminal act. 
 There is some worry that developing these laws will undermine the deterrence effects of holding 
people fully responsible regardless of impulse control. If we tailor our laws to a small aberrant 
population they may not apply as well to the population as a whole. Potential harms can be largely 
ameliorated by careful development of the law so as to not make them over-broad and applicable to 
81 
 
everyone outside of the selected population, and by developing tests such that we can recognize normal 
levels of impulse control within individuals. 
 
Section 5 - Should We Use Neurotechnologies in Sentencing?: 
 
Introduction: 
 The discussion in Chapter 4 so far has centered around the trial. The trial is the part of the 
judicial process that is most widely publicized and draws the most sensation. However, the phases that 
come after the determination of guilt are also important when it comes to actually altering illegal 
behaviour. To use a medical metaphor, the trial can be likened to a diagnosis, sentencing to deciding on 
a course of action, and the punitive phase to the actual course of treatment. While the diagnosis is 
important, only by deciding the best course of treatment for the particular individual can the illness be 
overcome. 
 Outside of the Charter I have found no piece of legislation that has more inherently ethical 
content than the sections of the Criminal Code concerning sentencing. Within its principles and 
guidelines exist, either explicitly or implicitly, a number of significant ethical concerns. My major task 
in this section will be to show how neuroscience can help us meet these legal and ethical objectives. 
 
Subsection 1 – The Status Quo: 
 Sentencing is the phase where a judge has the most discretion. Unless limited by a minimum or 
maximum sentence, judges can exercise broad discretion to assign punishments or treatment programs 
(as long as they accord with those used in like cases. See: s. 718 of the Criminal Code) (Roach, 2011). 
There are several sections of the criminal code which also limit punitive discretion, for example the 
guidelines to maximize liberty, making sure the principles of punishment are met, and ensuring that the 
punishment is proportional to the responsibility and severity of the crime. If the accused is willing to 
take full responsibility for the act, there are also alternative sentencing procedures which may be 
availed of depending on the specifics of the case. For example, if the accused shows signs of 
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overwhelming addiction, he or she can be directed towards drug treatment alternatives. 
 
Subsection 2 - Issues With the Status Quo: 
 Even with this broad discretion there remain significant issues with the current system. The 
major underlying issue is that during the sentencing trial the specific needs of the convicted individual 
need to be assessed. This assessment includes determining what will provide the best environment to 
encourage a change in behaviour. Using traditional methods (mainly questioning the guilty party and 
observing case history) it can be difficult to assess these needs. Furthermore, the ability to assess 
individual punitive needs is almost an entirely subjective process with few objective measurements 
from which to draw conclusions. 
 This inability to properly assess individual needs means that there is uncertainty about how 
effective a punishment will be at achieving its goals. If we are to protect society and maximize the 
liberty of the offender, then a better understanding of when offenders must be restrained and when 
offenders can make their own decisions will allow us the best possible balance of these objectives. 
 
Subsection 3 – What Does Neuroscience Suggest?: 
 Luckily neuroscience offers a potential solution to the problem of determining an appropriate 
sentence based on individual characteristics. The initial problem is to decide what types of treatment 
are most appropriate for the specific case. If irresistible impulse or diminished responsibility defenses 
were offered during the trial, evidence from psychiatric testimony (preferably with neuroscientific 
corroboration) could be helpful in determining a sentence. Even if the defense was not successful the 
information gained could still be useful in the sentencing trial. In fact, as the standards for evidence are 
often less stringent in sentencing trials, the evidence that was turned down when determining guilt, or 
newly generated evidence that wouldn't have been allowed in trial, could still be quite useful when 
determining the appropriate sentence. 
 A first step would be to measure brain activity in a way that allows for a determination of 
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particular deficits and capacities. These measurements could be made during trial or during sentencing. 
Such a snapshot can be taken by several different technologies. MRI offers a way to get functional and 
structural data, but is exceedingly costly. EEG offers an alternative. Though EEG does not allow for 
structural scans it does have several advantages (Evans and Abarbanel, 1999). First and foremost there 
are already significant libraries of EEG scans (QEEG libraries) that contain images from thousands of 
people's brains. These people may have mental disorders, or they may be normal but in a number of 
different states (after consuming certain substances, for example Caffeine). A defendant with a 
suspected impulse-related deficit (including drug addiction) could undergo an EEG procedure in order 
to compare the result to the existing QEEG database. This comparison may not prove useful if the 
offender is sufficiently dissimilar to the subjects currently in the database.  
 A legal neuroscientific research remedy to this problem could include taking similar QEEG 
scans for a large sample of prisoners, both with and without impulse issues and throughout their 
incarceration or treatment. This data could be correlated with some notes about what conditions they 
are under, treatment they are receiving, and any relevant incidents and outcomes. Such an approach 
would create a database which would be much more directly applicable to the criminal population and 
the particular offender and could offer useful information and advice about the most effective courses 
of treatment for these types of brains. By engaging in this evidence-based approach to punishment, 
neuroscience could add a markedly more objective set of data from which to draw conclusions. 
 
Subsection 4 – Ethics Analysis: 
 As I indicated above there is a significant amount of ethical content in the sections of the 
Criminal Code dedicated to sentencing. I discussed the relevant sections and clauses in the last section 
of Chapter 3 and will examine their ethical import in the following and make special note of any gains 
in therapeutic value offered by the application of neuroscience. 
 The first sentencing guideline I discussed in Chapter 3 stated that one of the purposes of 
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sentencing is towards specific and general deterrence. Meeting the goals of specific deterrence, that is 
making sure the accused does not engage in the illegal behaviour again, can certainly be aided by the 
application of neurotechnologies sensitive to impulsivity. If deterrence requires that an individual must 
think of the possible penal consequences of their actions, then sentences intended to deter illegal 
behaviours brought about by subconscious impulses are destined to fail. Instead the sentence must take 
into account these subconscious impulses and suggest a course of punishment that will give the 
offender greater control over their actions. 
It may be that the only way to deter a particular impulsive offender will be to sentence them to 
the most effective therapeutic treatments that allow them to gain control over their impulses. Section 
718 (d) of the Criminal Code states that rehabilitation is one of the major objectives of punishment. 
Objective impulsivity measurements that allow one to categorize offenders into different therapeutic 
groups would significantly aid in the rehabilitative effort. As an analogy, consider other diseases, such 
as cancer. If one only knows that a given set of patients has cancer, it is difficult to prescribe the 
appropriate treatment that will be most effective for an individual. In such a case a doctor would have 
to half-blindly prescribe the medication that will most help the greatest number. Instead, if one can say 
that one person has melanoma, one has leukemia, and one has a glioblastoma, then more specific and 
therefore effective treatments can be given. 
 Section 718 (f) and Section 718 of the Criminal Code make explicit reference to the 
“responsibility of the offender”. Data about subconscious impulse can significantly aid judgments 
about how responsible someone was for an offence. Such information will be multifaceted in its aid. 
First, the information allows the judge to see how meaningfully responsible the offender was for acting, 
which in turn allows the judge to determine how much the offender deserves retributivist punishment 
versus therapeutic treatment. Second, any information about when the offender could or could not 
control their actions would be useful to the offender themselves if they are interested in altering their 
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behaviour. Thus, by allowing both judge and judged to gain clarity as to the true level of responsibility 
both are aided in improving the lot of the individual and society. 
 Clause iii.1 of Section 718.2 (a) of the Criminal Code deals with aggravating circumstances. If 
the victim suffered significant negative impact, then the sentence of the offender can be made more 
serious. For example, an assault may leave a victim with lasting fearful impulses. In such a case, the 
charge could be aggravated. Such an approach would be a logical extension of the “Thin Skull” rule. 
This rule states that, no matter the intention of the offender, if the victim is severally harmed because of 
an innate piece of their biology, in this case a brain which rapidly develops powerful and fearful 
impulses, then the offender must take full responsibility for the damage done (Roach, 2011). Thus, if 
the sentence must be proportional to the gravity of the offence and the responsibility of the offender 
(section 718.1) this evidence could aggravate the sentence significantly. 
 Section 718 (b) embodies the ethical concept of justice. Essentially the section states that like 
offenders must be treated in a like manner, which implies that individual offenders must be treated in 
an individual manner. How offenders differ and how they are similar is difficult to ascertain and the 
effort could be significantly supplemented by objective data which indicates similar brains and neural 
reactions to stimuli. Doing so would normalize treatment across individuals who, at first glance, may 
not seem to be similar but, upon deeper inquiry, have similar impulsive deficits. 
 Finally 718.2 (d) embodies the concept of liberty. The section says that liberty should not be 
limited any more than necessary as permitted by the circumstances. Understanding an individual's 
impulsive tendencies should allow the sentence to restrict freedom in areas where there is doubt that 
control can be maintained, but at the same time allow freedom in those where control can be 
maintained. For example, probation often comes along with certain conditions which restrict liberty. 
There may be a curfew, a prohibition on alcohol consumption, or areas which are off limits. A better 
understanding of someone's control capacities would allow such a program to be tailored to maximize 
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freedom while at the same time safeguarding society. 
 
Conclusion: 
 Of all the areas of the law I have discussed it is for sentencing that neuroscience holds the most 
helpful promise. The inaccuracy of assessing the needs of offenders subjectively through naturally 
accessible behaviours means that even the best intentioned sentencing guidelines can fall short. 
Neuroscience holds the promise of adding objective data to these judgments which can help organize 
the offender into a treatment category as well as further ensuring that liberty and justice are maximized. 
 
Thesis Conclusion: 
 Throughout this thesis I have attempted to show how the proper use of neurotechnologies can 
be helpful in making legal determinations. I argue that neuroscience is not going to overthrow our ideas 
of free will. Instead, neurotechnologies can be useful in the attempt to read the minds of others through 
increasing the number accessible correlates to the workings of the brain. I explored how we can put this 
increased access to the brain to use in cases where we have reason to suspect that criminal activity was 
influenced by impulses beyond the individual's control. The approach argued for throughout represents 
a middle ground between determinism and pure folk psychology. It grounds the usefulness of 
neuroscience in correlation and practical legal concerns. Similar approaches are currently being 
explored by other scholars and this thesis joins them in trying to create a workable synthesis between 
the law and neuroscience. At this point, however, no approach has moved beyond a rough exploratory 
theory. The fuller picture will have to wait until these paths of exploration have been scientifically 
examined in earnest.  
I examined several areas of the criminal law for which neuroscience could prove a useful tool. 
Criminal cases dealing with illegal substances are one such area of the law. In these cases neuroscience 
holds the potential of strengthening some of our current justifications for scheduling illegal substances 
and for sentencing, and of causing us to question our other justifications. I also discussed irresistible 
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impulse defenses and diminished responsibility defenses. A successful irresistible impulse defense 
would fully shield from criminal responsibility those who performed an action over which they had no 
substantial control. A successful diminished responsibility defense would partially shield those who 
were partially hindered in their ability to control impulses. Finally I discussed how our sentencing 
guidelines can be aided by more accurate characterizations of brains. 
 To summarize, this thesis shows that in order to be ethically justified, the criminal law must 
endeavor to accurately characterize the people it brings up on charges. We now have technologies, 
provided by neuroscience, which allow us to gain ever greater accuracy in modeling behaviour. I argue 
that the law should take full advantage of these capacities. 
 Neuroscience is developing quickly. In the final chapter I provide ethical arguments for how 
and why these changes within neuroscience should be applied to the law given how they will affect the 
individual, the judiciary, and society as a whole. It is important that work in this area of intersection 
between neuroscience and the law continues and that the likely ethical outcomes continue to be 
weighed from the start. 
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